[0:00]get to see us again. >> I'd like to say chair, it's nice to be back, but I'm sure not sure it's entirely honest, but anyway, I might be accused of misleading you. >> But I think the thing to do is to remind
[0:11]you that you're no longer a civil servant. Um, so I suppose the first question is is uh you did have eight eight months left on your contract before you left. Um, so why did you
[0:22]leave? >> Um, I I'll be honest and open with you. Uh, and I'm no longer a civil servant. wasn't it wasn't my choice to leave at uh at that point chair and I would have
[0:31]preferred to see out my tenure but after uh what I think was a very successful transition to the to the labor team in
[0:40]the FCDO David Lambie wanted to make a change and told me that and told me he wanted somebody who would lead the department over the years ahead and carry out a major transformation program
[0:51]so I I agreed to leave and it's and just to finish >> a major major transformation program >> department means is what >> well >> there's 25% cuts in the staff >> uh that at the time wasn't obviously
[1:02]known because there hadn't been the spending review chair but it's not that unusual I finish my thoughts on this for >> for for a permanent secretary to change you know following a a change of party
[1:13]of of government so I agreed to step down in in January of of last year >> okay um I mean I know that you were really only properly involved in the uh
[1:23]process for uh the appointment of Peter Medson for a very short time. Um, so I think probably basically December to mid January. Um, but can I just take you
[1:33]back to a few months prior to that? Um, before Donald Trump was elected president, we've got Karen Pierce, who's the ambassador of the United States,
[1:43]very experienced ambassador, popular uh with uh with the Biden team and with uh the Trump team as well. Um, we've got an internal candidate who's been who's been
[1:55]um there's been a process for getting a replacement for Karen Pierce when she steps down, I believe. Um so as I think is is clear from Lord
[2:06]Casease's advice to the prime minister. >> Yes. >> Revealed in the papers given to the to the humble address. The the last government decided uh in
[2:17]the first part of 2024 to hold an internal competition for uh to find a replacement for for Dame for Dame Karen. Um and that individual was was
[2:28]recommended at the end of that process but in the end it wasn't taken forward because the general election was was called and the appointment process was frozen under the rules that apply on
[2:40]significant decisions during an election period. So it was >> I see I didn't realize it was pre-election. Right. >> It was before the election. >> Okay. Cool.
[2:51]Um so uh so let's go to you know late summer early September. Um what discussions were taking place about an alternative candidate then?
[3:03]>> I wasn't involved in any discussions at that point. >> Right. And and um and then two months later we have Peter Mandlesson announced as ambassador to the United States. Were
[3:13]you I mean in what at what stage were you involved in a >> Yeah. No, good good question. I I was first involved when I was uh in mid December told of the prime minister's
[3:24]decision to make a political appointment as ambassador. >> Yeah. >> And that political appointment was uh was Peter was Peter Mandlesson. So that was when I was first first involved. It
[3:34]was if I if I call right um the 15th of December. So the beginning of the week that ended with his announcement.
[3:43]>> Okay. Um and then from the first trunch of the humble address papers um we've seen that between November the 11th and December the 11th the prime minister's
[3:52]PPS and private secretary um uh for the foreign office give advice. We see the then cabinet secretary assignment case give his advice and we see the due
[4:03]diligence carried out by the cabinet office but we don't see advice from you. I mean, it may be for members of the public that seems surprising that you're not that you know, were you ever asked
[4:15]your opinion about appointing Peter Madison as ambassador? I mean, you were in charge of the foreign office. Um, the first I was aware of the decision was
[4:25]when I was told uh on the 15th of December. The first I was aware of the advice that had gone through the prime minister or indeed that it was being formulated was when I read it in the
[4:35]humble address release papers. I wasn't involved. I wasn't told a decision was coming. >> Would you have expected to? I think it is well I think two things on there. I
[4:46]think one is on the face of it it is it is reasonable for the head of the foreign office to be involved in thinking around what is our our major
[4:56]top bational ambassador post. On on the other hand uh given clearly the prime minister was deciding to make a political appointment I think it is also
[5:06]reasonable that civil servants would not be directly involved in discussions around what is a political appointment because in the end that is a matter for elected elected politicians and I can
[5:17]also see the sensitivity. So I'm I'm a bit conflicted. I mean clearly I think ideally you want to have a situation where there is a you know tight and
[5:26]small circle of of people who can be consulted on on a big decision like this on a basis of on a basis of trust but I can also see that you know in the end it
[5:36]was a political matter and I suspect I had no knowledge that this was discussed in in political circles at the top of the government. >> In a circle of trust do you think you'd have a place? >> Look not not in a political
[5:48]conversation. No, but in the end this is an appointment to the to the most senior job uh in our in our foreign service. I was head of the head of the diplomatic
[5:59]service. So I think it is possible without asking me as a civil servant or any head of the the diplomatic service. I think it is possible for them to be involved in a conversation for example
[6:10]around um you know what what is what are the requirements you know what does the UK need in the period ahead and that sort of thing even if that isn't you're not then involved in the absolute decision-m
[6:22]discussions around individuals who are politicians because it's a political appointment >> thank you chair um can I just follow up
[6:31]one or two of the questions for chair um you said that the process had been underway for an internal competition but
[6:39]come the general election it was frozen once the new government had been elected was the process not the then recommenced
[6:50]>> um well I think I mean I I wasn't involved as I said so I I I don't know whether that was uh considered very much obviously you have seen uh the then
[7:00]cabinet secretary's advice uh on that and that's all I know about it is that advice. >> The foreign office must have been continuing to
[7:12]look at potential candidates to replace Karen Pierce. >> The you know the view Karen Pierce had had agreed had basically been agreed formally as the as
[7:23]the notes say to stay until January 2025. I took the view that actually what made most sense was to know the outcome of both the UK
[7:34]uh general election but also the US presidential elections and obviously there was until the election was called there was an uncertainty around the timing of the UK general election given our political system you with an end
[7:45]point of January 2025 Karen and I had discussed therefore whether or not if required she'd be willing to stay a bit longer while we
[7:55]while we were able to see how how those two elections uh played out as it were. So there was there was flexibility. So to answer your question um in terms of September
[8:07]uh September of 2024 that was before we knew the outcome of the the US elections the new government was only only just in. So the FCDO and I were not actively
[8:18]looking at that point for candidates because I felt we had we had time to see the outcome of the of the US elections. And Karen had Karen had shown shown flexibility over exactly when she ended
[8:30]in the in the beginning part of 2025. >> And when were you first told that it was likely to be a political appointment? >> When I was told of the prime minister's decision. >> The 15th of December.
[8:42]>> Yes. So until the 15th of December, you had no information that any discussion had taken place or certainly that a decision had been reached? >> No.
[8:52]>> And when you were told that a decision had been reached and it was Peter Mandlesson, did you express any concerns about that? >> I was I was, as I say, I was told of a
[9:03]decision. So I wasn't asked for uh advice. I was told a due diligence process had been carried out. uh and as and I think this is known now as the
[9:14]prime minister had been made aware of the risks and had accepted those risks and decided to proceed. So I then moved on to a conversation was asked for
[9:24]advice on on the practical steps to require for to to meet what was the prime minister's decision and then the requirements around the time scale. You say the prime minister had been made
[9:36]aware aware of the risks but he hadn't because the deep vetting had developed vetting hadn't been carried out. So all that had taken place was the due diligence. Did you ask whether or not
[9:47]developed vetting had been taken out or had taken place or >> it was clear at that point that vetting had not taken had not taken place. It was you know it was clear to me at that point the step that had taken place was
[9:58]due diligence not vetting. >> Can I just ask you do you remember who it was that was telling you these things? Uh I had a conversation with the private secretary in in number 10 >> and did you express a view as to whether
[10:10]or not develop vetting should take place before an announcement? >> Yeah. So on uh on that um the later that
[10:20]week uh as we were taking forward the practical steps required the cabinet office initially said that as Mandlesson
[10:29]was to use the the technical phrase from the from the guidance a fit and proper person as a member of the House of Lords
[10:38]uh he did not require develop vetting. I mean to be honest with you I thought that was um odd and insufficient. You know I'd been deputy ambassador in Washington and
[10:49]therefore occasionally charge and I knew very well to do the job effectively you have to be party to some of the deepest
[10:57]secrets that the UK uh government holds. But I also recognized that the situation was was unusual. uh and I therefore asked for advice although it's pretty
[11:09]clear in my own mind from from the FCDO security team. Um they uh came back to me after discussions with the cabinet
[11:19]office uh and said that their advice was that he should have DV and I absolutely agreed with that and by then the cabinet office had reflected further and they
[11:28]also and they also agreed. Um and that if I remember right that conversation started at the back end of of the week
[11:38]of the 16th of December at the time of the public announcements made and then by the beginning of the following week just before Christmas uh it was clear uh that you know that
[11:49]was going to be the requirement. That's what I I thought as it were and I endorsed the advice and at that point um Mandlesson was sent the forms that you need to fill in to kick off the whole process. I mean, we have had a bit of a
[12:01]he said, she said on this. We've got the cabinet office saying that the foreign office asked, "Does he really need DV?" And the and the Cabinet Office saying that the foreign office asked, "Does he
[12:12]really need DV?" But you're down on the foreign office side that it was the Cabinet Office that said it first. >> Look, I I I I can't promise you who said what first. I know what I was told. I
[12:23]was told the Cabinet Office suggested he didn't require DV. um uh there clearly you know self-evidently uh was some further back and forth and consideration and you know I don't want
[12:33]to give you the impression uh that when we were taking forward the DV there were people in the center still saying don't do that you know by the by the beginning of the following week everyone was
[12:43]agreed that he should have DV and therefore it was now about taking that process forward but I've given you my account of my memory of of what I heard and what I thought at the time
[12:54]>> one thing is for sure nobody Nobody made a note of it. >> You know, in the end, these are about practical arrangements rather than things which you know are under, you know, chair. I know you've talked in
[13:05]previous hearings about civil servants writing everything down. But I also agree with those who've said to the committee that actually if you're going to get work done, you simply cannot and do not have time to record every
[13:16]interaction. The key thing is what was the decision? The decision was he required DV and that is recorded. So the decision was he required DV. That was your view. It was the view of the
[13:27]Foreign Office Security Department. Yet we know that prior to his obtaining DV clearance, he was given access to information which would usually require
[13:37]DV to have been completed. So how did that come about? >> So you had a uh I think it's I can't remember if it's seven or eight pages, but it's certainly lengthy and thorough
[13:48]response from the SDO yesterday. you sent them a a very long not very long I don't mean a critical way. A a a list of questions. I didn't I didn't mean long in a critical way. A list of questions
[13:59]and you know they're very good questions. I think there are good answers in the FCDO's response. I I recognize them from the consideration of
[14:08]the the time. uh the the context I would I was going to share on this point is you have a a publicly announced
[14:18]uh ambassador designate to do the most the single most important ambassador job for the UK. You have a very very compressed time scale you're being asked
[14:28]to meet uh for them to start their role uh in Washington. uh and you have uh the um exceptional
[14:38]circumstances of an incoming uh Trump administration and a very high premium therefore in in the new ambassador arriving as well briefed as possible in
[14:48]the short time available recognizing that normally ambassadors have have several months to prepare for for big jobs like this and that required uh
[14:59]Mandles to have access to briefings and papers to allow him to be properly prepared. And so, as reflected in what the foreign office said to you in the
[15:09]note last night, a decision was taken in line with the guidance that he should be given access to the building and and access to the paperwork in particular on uh for example, you know, the UK
[15:21]government's preparations and policies towards an incoming administration. And I uh was given that advice and I endorsed it and I, you know, I I signed off on it. uh and I think it was the
[15:32]right thing to do to make sure that as I say the prime minister's choice for ambassador was properly prepared when he started his his job. I think it would be very odd not to do that.
[15:41]>> Does look odd though because he's got a green pass which is means that he's got DV and he had a DV pass on the very day
[15:51]that according to the uh the DV people he should be recommended to not get DV. So on the day that Ollie Robbins is making his decision that it's
[16:02]borderline, Mandlesen is wandering around the the foreign office with a DV pass. There's a photograph of him going into the foreign office on that day. Yeah, I you know I don't know the answer on the on the
[16:13]actual type of pass and it was clear to everybody and I can't quite remember what the letter from the foreign office last night said was that and it was I think clear at the time was that he
[16:24]didn't have DB and there were limits to what he could be see and told and again I do think this is in the letter last night but I can't quite remember I do think there was a process in place to to
[16:35]tell people who were going to brief him uh that uh there was a certain level of classification they could go up to in talking to him and they couldn't go beyond that because he didn't have DV clearance.
[16:47]>> Okay. >> Can I just one final question just coming back to the answer you gave to the chair about your leaving your post. You said it David Lammy told you that he
[16:57]wanted to make a change um because of the transformation program. >> Yes. Do you believe that your concerns about the way in which Peter Mandlesson
[17:08]had been appointed had any influence on the decision to ask you to leave early? >> No, for a simple timing reason. I mean, I announced to the department I was
[17:17]leaving on the 4th of November 2024. I didn't know anything about uh Mandlesson until the middle of December. So, so the
[17:26]answer is straightforwardly no. >> Afrey, you wanted to follow up. >> Yes. Thank you. So, I just wanted to um check with you. I mean, obviously,
[17:35]despite being head of the diplomatic service, you obviously hadn't been asked uh by number 10 uh or the prime minister directly or indirect directly your view
[17:47]on Peter Manderson's suitability for the role. Had you been, would you have wanted to raise or would you have said you had concerns about the reputational
[17:57]risks that he carried? You know, I I think that is a really genuinely a really hard question to answer because, you know, hindsight is a is a
[18:06]fantastically wonderful thing and it is is hypothetical. But let me, you know, let me have a go at what I was thinking at the time. I mean, firstly, you know, it's just worth
[18:17]repeating. At no point did anyone consult me, ask me. I was presented with a decision. There was no spa and told to get on with it. There was no space for
[18:27]dialogue. I'm you know you know that I think look it is the most important job we have. I had been I had been deputy
[18:38]ambassador. I knew the US well from I mean from 10 years previously and obviously worked a lot on the United States throughout my diplomatic career. I think I had a sense and an
[18:49]understanding of of US politics uh which which gave me a um an idea of what might or might might not be a problem further
[18:58]down the track. And so I had a I had a concern at the time was a part of me that had a concern at the time that I know anything that wasn't in the public
[19:09]domain. Obviously, we know now a lot more about Mandlesson's links to Epstein, but I had a concern that a man who, you know, demonstrabably from the public record at the time, and it's
[19:19]clearly much bigger than we all knew, had a link to Epstein and that Epstein through both the presidential election campaign in the US and more generally in
[19:29]US politics uh had had been and was a controversial figure and I was worried uh I was worried that this could become a p problem in future. future. Not
[19:40]because I was expecting that we were going to find out more because up to honest I wasn't and who would necessarily know, but much more I just thought that it was a potentially difficult issue politically in the
[19:50]United States. So that that is a very candid account of probably what I was what I was thinking >> thinking at the time. But there was no space or avenue or mechanism for me to
[20:01]to put that on the table. A decision had been taken. It was a political decision. I mean, you mentioned, of course, the the the links to Jeffrey Epstein, which were in the media at the time. Did you
[20:12]have concerns about Mandlesson's business relationships with China or Russia? >> So, please don't laugh, but I really didn't actually follow what Mandlesson
[20:22]was up to in his business relationships. You know, I I kind of knew about him when he was a government minister. So I didn't uh I didn't sort of have it right in front of my face and I and I didn't
[20:33]see the due diligence report uh what the details of those those were. Uh what I you know would always believe in is is is a vetting process to look at issues
[20:44]which might affect national security >> and and obviously you uh know the United States very well. your previous uh diplomatic role there. You you probably
[20:55]had links with um people who were out there, were you aware of any views that were expressed by the president's transitional team about concerns about
[21:05]Mandlesson being given that post or about um Dame Karen Pierce being moved on from the post? >> I think there's quite a lot already in the public domain. There was, you know,
[21:14]at least one uh tweet from someone close to uh to Trump uh reminding people of of what Manderson had said about Trump many
[21:25]years before when he was president previously. Um I think the um
[21:32]uh those around Trump felt um blindsided by the announcement at short at short notice. um should we say and it
[21:44]it was clear also that Karen and her her team had done an excellent job in establishing relationships and access to to President-elect Trump and also when he
[21:54]was a a candidate you doing their jobs that's a hard thing to do particularly in in the political climate in in the US while maintaining good relationship with the current administration and Trump
[22:04]again on the record had said that he he you know he he'd like Karen work well with her and be happy for her to stay so that's rather a long way of saying yes. >> Thank you.
[22:15]Um can I just um just on what you were saying earlier about uh about the DV and the and the access point it it's just to be fair on you it is page five of the
[22:24]Thank you very much statement follow um paragraph it's paragraph five and it's uh where I believe that it says
[22:32]>> um uh uh Lord Mandlesson's private secretary should in advance inform people that he was meeting that that they knew he he did not yet have DV clearance.
[22:43]>> Thank you. Um Richard, >> thank you chair and uh thank you sir Phillip for returning to the foreign affairs committee to to give evidence. The prime minister's national security
[22:55]advisor Jonathan Powell was reflecting last September on uh on the discussions that were had in government the year before about Lord Mandlesson's
[23:06]appointment and he reflected that uh that that you sillip had reservations. Can you remember what you were saying to the national security adviser about your
[23:16]reservations uh around appointing Lord Mandelson back in 2024? >> I think it was along very much along the lines of what I've just said around the
[23:25]possibility of his known connection uh to Epstein causing an issue subsequently. Uh obviously I didn't know what was
[23:36]actually going to happen um because Epstein was such a uh um hot beer toxic hot potato uh
[23:47]subject in US politics self including in the election campaign. So I I that is what I recall thinking at the time and can't prove this because I don't know
[23:58]what Jonathan was thinking when he said it last September but my instinct is that's what it refers to. Okay. >> And then thinking later on that year about the number 10 operation. Uh do you
[24:10]recall any dismissiveness in number 10 about the importance of vetting and if so how was that communicated to you? I think the interest I think the I
[24:23]wouldn't use the word dismissive. The word I would use is uninterested. Uh I think you know people wanted to know all the practical steps required for
[24:33]Mandlesson to arrive in in Washington on or around by by or around the organization sorry excuse me inauguration date uh needed to be
[24:44]completed. you know at at pace as it were and that was that was it the interest I mean no one you know to be honest with you no one said to me look Philillip you know the prime minister
[24:55]notices some risks around this can you really really make sure that the the vetting is done rigorously and it's always rigorous anyway but that wasn't the sort of thing being communicated
[25:05]sort of thing was fine he needs vetting make sure it's done in time >> thank you um last week when sir Ollie gave evidence to the committee
[25:16]Uh I said that Sam Coats had reported words around just to prove it. Um and I I need to correct the record slightly
[25:25]because uh Sam Coats didn't actually uh report that. He didn't file a report. He he did discuss it with a member of this committee. He didn't actually uh put it in writing. It didn't get off the
[25:35]cutting room floor. But it doesn't take away from the fact that his reply um made plain that uh he had a strong sense that there was an atmosphere of pressure
[25:46]and a certain dismissiveness about this uh developed vetting. Um could you comment on that uh atmosphere of pressure as you understood it in late
[25:58]2024? >> Can I just say one thing about the non-reported phone call and use of a particular work? I think it's important. time I say this look firstly I didn't receive any direct
[26:10]calls uh from the chief of staff during my time as permanent under secretary so there was no there was no call at all uh so my interactions with him were always
[26:20]when others were present in a you in a general meeting there weren't there weren't very many of those either this this story or versions of it has been in the media persistently or floating
[26:31]around the media since last September there's different versions sometimes involving swear words sometimes not. And I've really racked my brains and I cannot recall
[26:42]Morgan Mweeny swearing in a meeting at me or indeed just in in general. And so I I don't see any substance in in this
[26:52]that part of it. And I think it's important I say that this morning given how many people have come to think that might be true. Uh in not answering your question, I've slightly forgotten what your actual question was. I know I
[27:04]didn't answer it. I did that on purpose, but just was it just can you just the headline at the end of your question? Sorry. >> Uh so Ollie when uh when replying last week said that there was a an atmosphere
[27:14]of pressure and a certain dismissiveness about this DV process and I wondered if you could comment on the atmosphere of pressure please. I think you know where where I would start is you know on the
[27:26]on the 18th of December I received a letter from the principal private secretary to the prime minister and it's the one released as part of the
[27:36]humble humble address. Um I didn't receive letters from the principal private secretary to the prime minister very often. You know, most of my dealings was with the foreign affairs
[27:48]team in the number 10 as you as you'd expect. Uh and the letter as you know basically says prime minister has
[27:55]decided and it then goes on to say uh please could arrangements be put in place to that effect for uh a handover
[28:06]um by the by the inauguration. a very compressed time scale and that in effect is the top of the government saying the prime
[28:17]minister has decided he wants man's ambassador and he wants it done in that time scale. So that that is what creates
[28:29]the pressure. There were there were you know there were conversations around progress. Um but I think you know no one in the FCDO working on this Can there
[28:39]have been any doubts of the urgency of the issue and the importance that number 10 and the prime minister attached to to Manlson being in DC in very in very short in very short order.
[28:51]>> Can I help you on page 22 of the bundle that's in front of you? Uh it's the the letter is there. >> Yeah. Now I've Thanks. I've got the I've got the letter. I mean it's it's you know it's clear. I mean it's clear you
[29:03]please please would you take forward the necessary arrangements at pace. We would like to secure Agrial as soon as possible the formal agreements of the US government as it were
[29:14]as as as soon as possible to enable a handover in advance of the US inauguration >> in advance at the US. >> Yeah. At that point that that was the ambition at the start. >> The so the so the left so the he he's given the job on the 20th of December
[29:25]and they want him at the US inauguration on the 20th of January. >> Correct. >> So you have a month. >> Yes. Um, sorry. Does that answer your your
[29:37]question? >> Um, it it does. Thank you. Uh, and and I have another and it relates to that that time in December. Uh, and I just wanted to sort of try and and get an idea for uh some of the events that were
[29:49]happening in December of 2024. Uh, the prime minister gave a speech on the 5th of December where he talked about uh the tepid bath. And just to to recap for for
[29:59]people not familiar with it, um he he said uh that uh people in Whiteall uh are comfortable in the tepid bath of
[30:09]managed decline. The implication was that the civil service was satisfied to stagnate and was not sufficiently reactive to political direction. I
[30:19]wonder whether uh that had an any influence on the on the culture and and the way in which the civil service was reacting to to pressure around this
[30:30]political appointment. I >> I honestly don't think it did actually. I honestly think um the FCDO once it was clear a decision had been taken and and
[30:41]had been through the formal signoff process with uh his majesty the king did what it always does lent in and did its level best to deliver uh minister's
[30:53]ambitions in this case the prime minister's ambition and I think that would have done that whether or not the prime minister had made uh made made a speech about the civil service earlier in the month um to be honest with you I
[31:04]think you know actually think the foreign office and all the officials involved in the cabinet office and number 10 as well I mean they all acted in my view you know certainly the ones I
[31:15]was collaborated in good faith at the time to try and deliver a very very ambitious ask in terms of the in terms of the time scale because that was what
[31:25]uh with the professional thing to do one more chair if I may uh the the prime minister said at PMQ's last week that quote no pressure existed whatsoever in
[31:36]relation to this case. How can that be squared with Sir Ollie's evidence last week where he said that there was a a strong sense that there was an atmosphere of pressure? >> I don't think it's for me to do evidence
[31:48]squaring and obviously there's going to be other conversations around this and and you know I don't know uh who may or may not be asked to consider in more detail. I I I'd have to ask you what do
[31:58]you actually mean by your question? And the reason why I the reason I ask you that I'm not I'm not being difficult because I think there's two possible questions here. Question one is was
[32:08]there pressure on the substance of the DV case? Question two is was there pressure to get the DV case done in a particular time frame? And they are
[32:19]different time frame. Sorry, they are different questions and I worry >> there's two answers. >> I can give you two answers. I actually wrote down two answers there because I think there are two there are two there are two questions there and I do think some of the problem of them is people
[32:31]are talking past each other because they're actually talking about different things anyway I can't find my answers but I'll give them to you anyway so should I just carry on or you want to ask
[32:41]>> carry on answer one is you know during my tenure I was not aware of any pressure on the substance of the
[32:51]Mandlesson DV case. Question two, was there pressure? Absolutely. And I've I've described it and I also have seen uh what the foreign
[33:02]office said to you uh last night and recognize what is said in that letter about the pressure to get it done i.e. DV clearance by a particular time scale.
[33:13]As I said to you earlier, I don't think anyone could have been any doubt in the department working on this that there was pressure to get everything done as quickly as possible. And I recognize your distinction between time pressure
[33:25]and pressure on the substance of the vetting process, but I think it's reasonable to suppose that one can affect the other. If there is time pressure, if there is a desire to get
[33:35]the ambassador out to Washington DC before inauguration, then you can understand that the if that the FCDO has
[33:44]the delegated power to uh to to to give a a recommendation around developed vetting might also then lean on the substance as well as the timing.
[33:55]So if I recall right, uh sir Oie when he was giving evidence to you last week said that there was pressure on the time scale but that that did not affect his
[34:07]decision making on the substance of the case and the and the letter from the FCDO last night says uh he i.e The director
[34:18]ESND does not assess that this pressure, the general pressure influenced the professional judgment that was reached by himself or his team. Uh, and to be
[34:28]clear, I believe both of them >> even though they didn't manage to read the last page >> of what? >> There was a 10-page document of the DV and neither of them seemed to have read
[34:39]it. Was that anything to do with a pre time pressure or I I'm not aware I'm not aware of details of this paper. Yeah. Well, I I'm I'm not aware of the boxes. I've not seen a piece of paper with
[34:51]boxes on it either, ever in my uh in my career. So, you know, I I >> seems to have seen that. >> Thank you. Um uh Afrey, you've got one
[35:02]question and then I'm moving on to Afghan. just wanted to ask given this tight time frame that there was um we're also aware that back in September of
[35:12]2024 um Lord Case Simon Casease had written to the prime minister advising that security vetting should be carried out prior to the appointment of Peter
[35:22]Manderson but we know the announcement I think was made on the 20th of December 2024 and it wasn't until three days later as we've talked about that security vetting commenced. So what
[35:33]would you say was the process in place at the time for the order of security vetting and appointment announcement in your view? >> Sorry, can you just unpack slightly what you mean? I'm not sure.
[35:44]>> What would you say would be the normal order of process in place at the time? Would you say that the normal order would be vetting and then announcement? Yes.
[35:54]>> Or announcement and then vetting? >> No, the normal order is vetting and then announcement. >> Thank you. Do you have any idea why it went the
[36:06]other way round? >> Uh, no. The timing of the announcement was was driven and decided by number 10. >> Okay. Thank you. Um, Ab,
[36:16]>> thank you chair. Um, so just following on from colleagues um questions in relation to pressure. Um, what did that look like? I mean, were you receiving
[36:26]regular phone calls? Um, >> yeah. So I mean I think it's important to I'm not going to repeat myself but it's important to remember the overall framing in a sense you know you have the
[36:36]letter from from the principal private secretary I won't repeat myself but that provides the overall context um there were you know there were meetings um um
[36:48]in that in that week with number 10 um there would have then have been regular progress chasing um there was discussion around the exact timetable that went on
[37:00]um and so there was you know keen interest uh all the way through from number 10 that the practical arrangements required to get Mel into Washington in the time scale required or
[37:11]thereabouts uh was all was all moving all moving forward but in a sense the pressure was kind of set at the beginning and just carried on it wasn't a matter of did someone phone every day
[37:21]at 10:00 it was much more this is this ambitious timetable has been set >> um you you referenced earlier um cabinet's office as fit and proper exemption and you said that you thought
[37:32]this was odd and insufficient and unusual. Did you reference your concerns to number 10 or to the cabinet office? >> I didn't need to to be honest with you because what I did was I asked the FCDO
[37:44]security team for advice. Uh and then when the advice came back to me after their conversations with the cabinet office at that point everyone was agreed
[37:54]that uh he needed DV. So there were a number of emails that um came out in the humble address um
[38:04]subsequent to well prior to Mandolson uh being appointed. Was it normal for number 10 to be sending emails um to prospective candidates?
[38:14]>> No. I think to honest I would site I mean there you know for example uh if I remember right um and I can check if you want chair but if I remember right one of the emails
[38:24]attached conflict of interest forms which would normally be a um a departmental matter and it was in the end agreed that the conflict interest
[38:34]should be done by the FCDO. I think the fact that number 10 was at all points trying to accelerate, you know, to accelerate arrangements was was a strong signal of the the time pressure that
[38:46]everyone was was under. They were also trying to play their part. They were, you know, stepping in to do things which might in the past have been left the FCDO.
[38:56]>> And in one of the emails it references that you had a discussion with Mandel. What was that discussion?
[39:03]Um would I I um from memory uh I had a
[39:11]intro chat with Mandlesson on the day the Friday the day that um his appointment was announced and that was
[39:21]around practical matters of how the department would support him in his preparations to be the next ambassador now that that have been announced.
[39:31]>> Okay. And in again in one of the emails it references that an iPad, laptop, iPhone was given to Mandelson. Is that usual practice um to give to somebody
[39:41]who is not yet cleared? >> Uh it's not unpre it's not usual, but it's not unprecedented. >> Okay. And the emails also referenced
[39:52]that he'd had briefings um from senior officials at the FCDO. Um were you aware of the content of those briefings? I I didn't because obviously I wouldn't have
[40:01]had time uh being I wasn't aware of the precise every bit of it, but I was aware of the subjects uh that we were choosing to brief him on. And there was a kind of what you'd
[40:12]expect a proper professional process run by the the team in charge of our relationship with the United States to to give him uh access particularly to
[40:24]briefing on US government policy towards the incoming administration across a range of issues. And I I remember seeing the list of of issues and I probably looked at it and thought, "Yes, that looks like a sensible list." But I
[40:34]didn't look myself at the briefing and wouldn't have had or expect to uh to do that. >> In none of the emails, it makes
[40:42]reference to um him being subject to uh cleared vetting. So, it's it's almost as though he's got the job and we're just going through the process. Um, was there anything in any of the documents that
[40:54]said this is all subject to satisfactory uh DV? >> As far as I recall and I'm aware, the first time the documentation shows
[41:03]subject to DV is when the FCDO sent him what is a standard form of words for for people who jobs. I'm not
[41:13]aware of any other references in the in the documentation. I mean, would it be right to assume that
[41:22]had um the final clearance been I mean, would you foresee a situation where the final DV had been refused that that would have been rejected by the Cabinet
[41:33]Office? I mean, I can't foresee a situation where that would have happened given how he was um um treated um and all the emails have implied that he has the job. Would you have foreseen a
[41:45]situation where it could have been refused? Um, sorry. Could I'm not sure. Do what do you mean by that? Do you mean is it is it a possibility or do you mean >> could it have been a possibility?
[41:56]>> Well, I think you know you start a vetting process there has to be a possibility that at the end of that process someone is deemed uh not to meet the meet the standards to have you know develop national security vetting.
[42:08]>> Might have happened in this situation. >> I mean I don't know anything about the substance of the vettings. Yeah, I really I don't I'm you know, sorry to say this again, bit repeating what I said earlier. I don't at the time follow
[42:19]very much about Mandlesson's wider wider life. I mean, it's it's not an impossibility. >> I mean, it would you would have been a crisis if if it got to the point where he had no vetting clearance, that would
[42:30]have been a crisis self-eately. A publicly announced uh political appointment as the next ambassador to Washington, not being able to go, that would have been a big
[42:40]problem. But I mean presumably the DV is done with an open mind and it's done with an open mind whether we're going to do DV and if you fail it you're not going to get the
[42:51]job and um and so I think you know the question is really is that there's a an email uh which says that he's going to
[43:02]get briefed uh in person from the 6th of January onwards including on higher tiers presumably that means equivalent of the sort of information you'd get if
[43:12]you got DV. He's got a pass for people who've got DV. This is before he gets DV. He's on the payroll on from the 14th
[43:22]of January. I mean, it does all look like he's got the job already. >> He I mean I mean he got the job in the sense that he'd been announced by number
[43:33]10. Uh you know, the paperwork had gone to the his majesty the king. He'd been announced by number 10. We were seeking the agreement of the US government. So
[43:43]he in that sense he had got the job. >> What's the point in the DV? >> Because to do the job as I said sorry I'm not I should take the irritation out of I'm not irritated but because to do
[43:54]the job effectively um to do the job effectively you have to be able to have access to information that is of its sensitivity requires DV.
[44:05]So that's why he needed DV. If he'd been if he'd been failed, he would have had access to the buildings
[44:14]as if he had DV. He would have had access to information as if he'd had DV, and he would have failed it because he would have been seen as a security risk, and you would have exposed yourselves to
[44:26]him as a security risk during the period. I >> I don't I don't agree that with your kind of characterization of as though he had DV. He had access to the building,
[44:37]but parts of the building where people without DV also have access. He did not have access. >> Why did he have a green pass? >> He did not. I I don't You'll have to ask the foreign office about the path the
[44:47]passes. Uh he did not have access to the parts of the building uh where you absolutely do require TV and on the paperwork and I think this is in the foreign office letter. He was he had
[44:58]access under the rules as allowed as a fit and proper person and a member of the House of Lords. He had he had access to papers um up to certain level of classification. He didn't have general
[45:10]access. He wasn't able to uh roam free if you like in terms of access to information across across the department. So I can I can understand
[45:20]why it looks odd. I actually think it was the right thing to do to ensure at the time that in the short time scale that been given he could arrive in
[45:30]Washington properly prepared. The alternative would have been that we would have had an ambassador to the United States turning up not properly or fully briefed on the government's policies towards an incoming
[45:42]administration and that that would not have been right. It wouldn't have been proper for the foreign office to operate operate in that way. So I'm comfortable
[45:51]that it was the right decision at that point in time uh to give him that limited access under the rules. So, is this a fair way of putting it that given that he' been offered the job on the
[46:03]20th December and you've got Christmas and New Year in the way and he's got to be getting to New getting to Washington by the 20th of January, you were doing everything that you could to accommodate
[46:13]him being ready for that date >> within the rules. >> Was there a contingency plan in place for what might happen if he wasn't
[46:25]granted security clearance? >> No. Well done. >> Sorry, Edward. >> Edward,
[46:35]>> thank you, chair. Um, so Phillip, you said that you were informed by the principal private secretary in number 10 on the 15th. >> 18th.
[46:46]>> On the 18th. >> Sorry, I'm sorry. I No, I The word principal I was informed by a private secretary number 10 on the on the 15th. >> On the 15th, yes. that the prime minister wanted to avoid peace medicine. >> Yes.
[46:58]>> Was that a conversation? Because there's obviously then the subsequently the letter. >> Yeah, I was phoned up. >> You were phoned up. >> Um the letter just references the desire
[47:08]to appoint Peter Mandlesson. Your letter to the private secretary. >> Yeah. >> To the king. >> Yeah. >> Ass prime minister has indicated his intention to recommend a small number of
[47:20]political appointments. So when you had the conversation on the 15th that presumably was that the PM will make a number of
[47:30]appointments. To honest I can't recall I don't think it did. I think to be honest with you I think that let the first sentence of my letter uh that was a catchall uh sentence which I think was the way it
[47:42]was described to to your colleague uh in your in your hearing with with cat little. It was non-specific. It was a non-specific general catch rather than because I was being told there's more coming.
[47:53]>> Well, so obviously in his evidence, Sir Ollie Robbins said that he was asked or another name was floated to him, Matthew Doyle. Um, and not only that, he was
[48:05]asked to keep that information from the foreign secretary. If not during the conversation on the 15th, at any subsequent point were any other names floated to you for potential political
[48:16]appointees? Not not by that not by the Labor government. And I first I knew about Matthew Doyles when Oie gave you evidence.
[48:25]>> And in any conversations with number 10, were you ever asked to withhold information from the foreign secretary? >> Ever? Well, okay. So with the current
[48:36]admin I we should put on record, you have served under four different prime ministers. So um let let's establish at any point during your tenure as per were
[48:46]you asked by a number 10 organization to withhold information from the foreign secretary. How usual is that for that? >> I mean I'm worried that you're sort of everyone's going to think that the center of government spends its whole
[48:57]time sort of conniving behind the backs of uh everyone else in government and that's not the reality. The reality is you know people trying to get on with delivering the business of uh business
[49:07]of the government. you know, the vast majority of the time. I think my best answer to that question is unusual but in the end and I would say it's particularly around things where you
[49:18]might have a disagree a policy disagreement or difference of view between the prime minister and a secretary of state. It is not unheard of
[49:28]for permanent secretaries in a sense to try and work in a way which allow there to be a decision uh and a consensus view and the government can then move ahead and take it forward. And in that sort of
[49:39]situation, it's not unheard of for a permanent secretary to be privy to something that they don't pass on to or asked not to rather pass on to their secretary of state. So I would describe
[49:49]it as not unheard of. But I don't want to give the impression that this is kind of standard operating procedure. >> This is extraordinary. It's absolutely extraordinary. So the foreign secretary So the permanent secretary at the foreign office can be
[50:01]told don't tell your boss about this when they are the foreign secretary. Is it I mean does it honestly have you honestly has that ever happened to you
[50:10]before before this? >> Uh yes it has. >> Really? >> Yeah. >> You learn something new every day.
[50:20]>> It be the question does that does that operate in the other? Because a lot of this seems to come down to what the prime minister was told and when. So how frequently are people being asked to withhold information from the prime
[50:31]minister? >> Does that has has that happened as well? I I can't speak for number 10 or the prime minister. I would I would never say to number 10, you can't tell the prime minister. And I'll always work on
[50:42]the assumption if I'm speaking to number 10. there's a possibility and that's for them to judge that the information I'm I'm relaying to number 10 might go to the prime minister
[50:52]>> because much of this does seem to hinge on how much the prime minister knew when he was making a decision to appoint uh Peter Mandlesson and the briefing that
[51:03]he may or may not got. So >> I can't I can't help you with that because I wasn't involved. >> Appreciate that. Um you you said that you weren't involved in the decision-m process around Peter Manderson because it was a political appointment. Was the
[51:15]foreign secretary involved in the decision- making? >> I don't know. >> Okay. Um mentioned already you served under four prime ministers. um searched
[51:26]through the records and you can correct me on this suggest that the only other political appointed that happened during your tenure as per se was uh Sir George Hollenberry who was the former member of
[51:37]parliament for Neon Valley was appointed uh ambassador to Cuba um during the Johnson administration. Um comparing
[51:47]those two processes and the timelines How how marketkedly different was the
[51:57]Mandlesson appointment compared with the process that was taken out for the appointment of Sir George Hollen Mary? >> Um you might need to get chapter and
[52:07]verse on this from the FCDO. During my tenure the only two serving political appointees were Lord Llewell in Paris
[52:18]then Rome and you're quite right to George Hollingbury in in Cuba. I am I can't absolutely promise you because I started in September 2020 at the height
[52:29]of COVID and had to lead a complex uh merger. Um but from memory George Hollingbury's appointment was done
[52:39]before I started even if he didn't take up post until after I started. Um but certainly I wasn't involved in doing anything around his appointment. I think
[52:50]it was already on the Yeah, I said I think it was already certainly decided even it hadn't been announced and then it was taken forward in what I would describe as the normal way for an ambassadorial appointment with time to
[53:00]go through the the steps in the normal in the normal sequence if that if that answers your question. It does. Thank you. More broadly in terms of the process then um you've already mentioned
[53:12]that you have never seen the now infamous traffic light boxes. Um apparently according to the letter we received last night the departmental
[53:22]head of security had also never seen the traffic light boxes. wasn't aware that it was have. So Ali has talked us through the
[53:32]fact that he had a meeting with the head of security. Um have you ever had a meeting with a head of security to discuss whether or not somebody should
[53:44]be cleared DB in your time as PE? >> No, I don't recall uh a recommendation from UKV ever being escalated to me
[53:53]during my tenure. that was unique given that you had never had cause to see the traffic light system. Should it should we read anything into
[54:03]the fact that Sir Ollie when he had that meeting was not shown it? >> I I would rest on what you were told in the FCDO's letter last night.
[54:13]Can I just pick up on one point? >> Oh, the one point is anywhere. >> But so in the letter last night, it says this is unusual uh where um there's a
[54:24]difference between UK SV recommendation and FCDO sign off, but it says there's more than one a month. So >> sorry, the door open. I missed the last end of the
[54:34]>> the letter last night says that uh it's unusual not exceptional for UKSV recommendations to differ to the final
[54:44]FCDO decision on vetting but it says there's more than one a month uh in of those cases but you're saying that they're not raised to your to permanent secretary level
[54:56]>> correct >> you would then make that decision >> I think that set out in the letter if I remember right it sets out the decision decision making hierarchy but you you would have to get chapters first from
[55:06]the department. >> Thank you chair. If you'd become um aware, Sir Phillip, that there were
[55:14]issues with UKSV given how profile this high highprofile this appointment is, would you have raised this with the foreign secretary?
[55:24]Um I I don't I genuinely don't think that's a question I can I can answer because I don't know rightly I don't know anything
[55:34]about the substance of the uh of the concerns. So, >> and what I what I would say to you is look, you know, when you're when you're
[55:45]a permanent secretary, you have what I describe as as crucible moments. uh and you are basically being asked to decide
[55:54]something uh sensitive uh sometimes under time pressure uh and you can't discuss that with with anybody
[56:03]and I really don't think uh that I can seconduess um somebody's decision in those circumstances when I'm not in them and don't have the information and the
[56:13]environment of of that time >> understand but Mr. Philip, you've said that it's very unusual for security matters to be raised and that certainly in your time that had never happened.
[56:25]given how unusual it was and given the media spotlight on this already very controversial uh decision to appoint Peter Mandolson and and looking at that civil service
[56:36]code of conduct where um there's an expectation for ministers to be briefed properly by the civil service would you have exercised your judgment to say actually this is one of those times I
[56:47]perhaps need a conversation with the foreign secretary >> yeah you know I I I can't I can't genuinely I'm not being difficult I I genuinely can't answer that question in
[56:57]the abstract without having the briefing, knowing the information, knowing where you I can't tell you what I would have done. I I really I just actually don't know.
[57:07]>> Understand. Um do you recall your conversation with Sir Ollie regarding the handover of this decision? Um and in that conversation, did you discuss any of the pressures, whether that be time
[57:19]pressure or the kind of political pressure? Yeah, I'm I'm I'm sure that I gave that we had a we had about a week, but he spent certain amount of that time talking to other people and uh and
[57:30]reading reading documents and we had you know conversation at the beginning of the week and at the end of the week we had a a longish meeting where I kind of went through some of the senior
[57:40]personnel issues, talked about some of the future appointments that are coming up and and you know how he might want to to think about that and what you'd normally what you'd expect in a profession. professional handover and
[57:52]kind of some of the things that that I knew or wanted him to know that perhaps weren't uh you know I was probably the best placed person to actually uh tell him all of that. And so I did as part of
[58:02]that uh describe to him in headline terms the process that had been through and where we got to in the appointment of Mandlesson and and the preparations
[58:12]for him to arrive in Washington. And on as part of that process, did you raise any concerns that you had personally about this or any of your um risks that
[58:22]you thought may arise as a result of it? >> My memory is we you know we had a we had a general conversation mostly about where things what had happened where they got to. The one thing I do remember
[58:34]discussing and agreeing with uh with Ollie is is how we would handle the conflict of interest form. I'd seen a a
[58:43]draft of it and had commented on it, but it was and I agreed to this. It was I felt and he felt something that wasn't sensible
[58:53]for me to sign off in my final week, not least because he was going to have to justify whatever anything was in there. I do remember a conversation around
[59:04]uh how best to handle the conflict of interest in the transition from from me to him. >> Understood. Um, in your earlier answers, um, you spoke to the chair about the
[59:15]pressure to, um, get the ambassador in post before the inauguration >> um, and Christmas and other time pressures notwithstanding, that's why
[59:26]you did the process as you did. >> Would you have briefed anyone else um, who is considered for that post? um if they weren't a political appointment, let's say it was not Peter Madison and
[59:37]it wasn't a political appointment, but but you knew this was the most likely candidate, do you think that same thing would have happened? >> Yes. >> Okay. And on this um announcement, you
[59:48]said that the normal order was the vetting to happen first and the announcement second, but obviously um you say it's number 10's decision for it to have gone in this order. Did you know that that was going to happen? Were you
[59:59]aware that it was being announced? Uh when did I know it was going to be announced? I think by probably by the 18th of the end of the 18th of December.
[1:00:10]Certainly the by the morning of the n on the night either the end of the 18th or beginning of the Thursday. I knew number 10 were going to announce the following day.
[1:00:20]>> And and did you warn of any risks of proceeding this way? Did you speak to either the foreign secretary or uh anyone number 10 or anyone else in the department? Um
[1:00:30]>> well the D was cast to be honest. Um so I think we had a discussion around practicalities. >> There wasn't any intervention from viewers. In what regard >> that there are risks of proceeding this
[1:00:42]way that the normal process is the vetting happens first in the announcement second and by going ahead uh with this timeline that's not the
[1:00:52]normal process and at number 10 and the foreign office could be open to criticism andor um process. >> I mean to be honest I think that you know as I say the dive was cast the
[1:01:02]prime minister decided the time table was set number 10 wanted to announce. >> Thank you. I still don't understand this because if it if the die was so set that you
[1:01:13]weren't in a position to say I don't think this is a good idea. I think you should do DV first before the announcement. And yet you say it still wouldn't have been a problem. If he'd failed his DV, we would have announced
[1:01:25]that. I think the difference is if if there had been and I'm talking in the generic here obviously because I don't know anything about the substance but generically
[1:01:36]if there had been sufficient material in any case you've got you talking about the beginning of the process and the end of the process talking about you know
[1:01:46]beginning of the process one thing end of the process is a different thing because you've got a body of material and
[1:01:57]Who have I got next? Alan. >> Oh, sorry. And I've got Alan for one question and then I've got Flur. >> Thank you, Chair. Um, sir Phil, I should put on record that you and I worked briefly together when you were high commissioner to India and I was her
[1:02:07]majesty's then trade commissioner, a job for which I had to get DV um again. Nice to see you too. Um, the issue we're struggling with in part is is judgment. Uh, and one of the main problems is that
[1:02:18]initial judgment to appoint Peter Manderson was flawed. Um, some are trying to say that the FCDO process, the vetting process could have corrected that flawed initial decision. But is it
[1:02:28]fair to say that when you look at Ian Collard's response, um, politicians inserted enormous risk into the system by appointing Peter Mandlesson and what Ollie Robbins and the FCDO did was use
[1:02:39]their processes legitimately to manage that risk or or do you think they were outside of that standard FCDO process? Um I don't know anything about the
[1:02:50]substance and I have no view therefore on judgments arranged around the substance. I do think what they did as I understand it was within the process. >> Thank you chair. Um and thank you very
[1:03:03]much sir Philip for coming to give us evidence today. I've got some questions about the due diligence part of the process. Uh, were there any other FCDO appointments like this when you were told about the due diligence and it was
[1:03:14]an FCDO appointment after the due diligence had been done? >> Um, I'm not aware for Ambassador Jobs uh of any due diligence being done of
[1:03:26]this sort of form. Uh, it's not part of a normal civil service process. Um, so I don't I don't recognize it. >> In your experience, uh, have you had experience of people not passing due
[1:03:38]diligence? So is it is it a process which is a partial fail then >> it it's not a process it's not a standard process um I mean the closest I
[1:03:49]can come to is you know for example I mean this may be a total red herrings if you want me to stop I'll stop but recruitment for non-executive directors of of departments
[1:04:00]obviously outsiders because that's the point they they you know have in the past been subject to a um a look at their social media profile and that sort of thing to see whether that throws up
[1:04:12]anything which make them unsuitable for for a non-executive role in the government department but I mean is a bit different but that is the closest comparative in terms of yeah appointment
[1:04:23]processes to um full-time on the books jobs rather than non-executive role I'm not I'm yeah certainly in the FCDO it's not part of
[1:04:34]the process and certainly not for ambassador And >> so just a bit more on the process. So you were told about it on a phone call on the 15th of December, but you weren't
[1:04:43]given the due diligence um checklist which I've got in front of us. It's part of the humble address papers that was had already been completed. Did did you see the conflict of interest paper at
[1:04:54]the at that time? >> No, because it wasn't completed. It was basically sent to Mandlesson if I remember right the following week or the week after. I
[1:05:05]Let me just check to make sure I give you the right date on the conflict of interest. I saw that over the weekend of I think it was the uh fourth and fifth
[1:05:15]of January and I had some points on it either you know I didn't you know point further points I wanted addressed uh and
[1:05:27]so I I remember actually writing an email because it was a Sunday I wrote an email setting out those those points. Who did you write the email to? >> Uh my office, >> somebody in the department dealing with it.
[1:05:39]>> Okay. And and were they so they were the concerns which would have been raised by the due diligence form about the different things we can see here. Epstein for example was in that >> I think the the I can't speak to due
[1:05:50]diligence. I wasn't involved on the conflict of interest form's a clear form which yeah you fill out setting out thing areas in which in your life that
[1:05:59]might create a conflict and then there's a process with the line manager and and the ambassador Washington is managed by the permanent unsecary to agree uh whether that conflict's amountable or
[1:06:10]not and if you mitigations and and so on >> and is there a precedent of you seeing a due diligence form do you think you or or for asking I know this is an unusual appointment
[1:06:22]because the cabinet office did the due diligence so you didn't see it. Could you have asked for the FCDO to also do due diligence seeing that you were going to be um the Peter Mandlesson's line
[1:06:33]manager and so that you were directly responsible in that way? >> Yeah, if I remember right, I think I asked to see it and was told it formed advice to the prime minister and therefore wasn't something I could I
[1:06:45]could see. Look, I think what you're suggesting is that, you know, I've been told the prime minister has had due diligence done. He's seen it, decided this, and I'm going to say, well, that's not good enough for me. I'm going to do my own due diligence. I I, you know, I
[1:06:55]don't think that's plausible. Obviously, there was a, you know, the pre-existing conflict of interest process and national security vetting processes which were which were
[1:07:07]gone through. >> Just to be clear, in that week, I think you've been asked before about did you raise this with the foreign secretary? So this this week of the 15th, you were told the 18th it became public. Did you
[1:07:18]have a conversation with the foreign secretary um during that week? So it I mean this is the most highprofile appointment. It's a very controversial appointment. It's it seems >> I was clear in my own mind that I needed
[1:07:30]to know the foreign secretary was content before I went to his majesty the king to seek his agreement. diplomatic service appointment, you know,
[1:07:39]ambassador ultimately, you know, obviously prime minister involved as well, but responsible to the to the foreign secretary. If I remember right,
[1:07:49]um the Monday was the day of the annual Australia UK ministerial meeting, which both the foreign secretary and I pretty
[1:08:00]busy both in our own rights. my counterpart was here as well as as Penny Wong, but also together in in in joint meetings for much of the day. Um, my
[1:08:10]memory is that I had a brief word in the margins of that uh to relay to the foreign secretary what I had been told.
[1:08:20]Um, and if I remember right, he said he would talk to number 10. >> Okay. So, you were told by a phone call, then you were in the same meeting together. Um, and then you said, "I've
[1:08:31]been told that this is going to happen." And the foreign secretary said he would have words with number 10 after that. Then did you hear anything back from that? >> I I didn't say he would have words, which obviously can be read differently. Let's make this very clear.
[1:08:42]>> He said he said he would talk to >> he would talk to number 10 about that. And did you hear back from that before it was then then you wrote that letter to say he was appointed? Yes. Before I
[1:08:51]so I had the letter from uh the the private se the principal secretary of foreign affairs on the morning of the Wednesday the 18th. I established the
[1:09:01]foreign secretary was content for me to take forward uh the the process and I then wrote to Sir Clive and the letters part of the release as you know.
[1:09:12]>> Is there any record of that meeting where you had an establishment of the foreign secretary? Uh he was traveling and I I had a exchange with someone in the traveling party and had a message
[1:09:23]back. He was content for me to write. He was on his way I think to a dinner of NATO foreign ministers. >> Can I just follow up on this? So um you've you've said that
[1:09:34]that there was I mean the purpose of due diligence is to look at reputational risks. Yeah. And so if you if I was foreign secretary and one of my
[1:09:44]ambassadors had gone rogue, it would be for me to be answerable for that, right? So surely it's important in those circumstances for me to see the due diligence.
[1:09:54]>> I don't know the extent to which the foreign secretary was involved prior to the prime minister's decision. I >> don't understand what that answer is. You said that you'd you'd asked to see the due diligence and you were told that
[1:10:05]it was something for the prime minister and now you've given whatever answer that is. >> Uh sorry, could you would you mind repeating the question? Would you just repeat the question? >> Did did the foreign secretary see the
[1:10:17]due diligence or not before you tell the king I've discussed this with the foreign secretary who agrees with the recommendation? >> I'm not aware that he saw it.
[1:10:27]Are you aware that the foreign that the that the deputy prime minister has now said that there were worries um about Peter Mattson's appointment at the time
[1:10:38]um and he said to LBC that there that there was a discussion within government but that ultimately it was a matter for number 10
[1:10:47]>> um I saw the media report at the time >> and is that all you're going to tell me >> if you honestly I'm not being difficult if you ask me a question, I I will
[1:10:58]answer it. Um, and I'm and but I should also say I'm obviously not here to speak for the foreign secretary. You kindly said pointed out the beaming. I'm not a civil servant. Anyway, >> have a view on the accuracy of the statement.
[1:11:08]>> Just read it again to you know, I think you should ask the foreign if you want to know the foreign secretary's views. I I don't really feel >> you were there in the middle of all of this, right? You were there in the middle of all this. The foreign
[1:11:18]secretary is your boss. You know the foreign secretary, you're telling us that the foreign secretary was happy and you told the king that the foreign the foreign secretary now the former foreign secretary now the deputy prime minister
[1:11:29]is saying actually that there were concerns and there were discussions going on you know which is true. >> So got it. So I'm not I'm not being helful I promise you. Let me put it this
[1:11:39]way. I was asked what the foreign secretary said when I told him. He did not say Philillip please crack on right to the king. He actually said, "I'm
[1:11:50]going to talk to number 10." >> That's it. >> That's that because we were in the margins of a, you know, big important meetings with the top of the Australian
[1:12:00]foreign and security system in what in is always a very pressurized period in the runup to to Christmas. And this was about a political appointment. He was he
[1:12:10]was my, you know, political boss as sec as foreign secretary. I gave him the information I've been told. He said he would talk to number 10.
[1:12:20]>> Follow up to that. So, Philip, so yesterday the former foreign secretary, now deputy prime minister said as the chair said that they'd expressed he'd expressed worries. Um, and you said this
[1:12:31]was a conversation in the margins. But again, back to the how serious an appointment this is and and the level of media scrutiny already
[1:12:42]rightly on this appointment. Did you have any further conversations with the then foreign secretary about these worries? >> As I recall, he and I had a brief
[1:12:55]conversation. I can't remember it was the 18th or the sorry the 17th or the 18th, so the Tuesday or uh or the Wednesday. Um it was
[1:13:04]inconclusive. So he wasn't at that point um saying he was, you know, content for me to proceed. And I hadn't in any case received what I I asked for at the outset. I said the outset to number 10,
[1:13:16]I'm not doing anything until I've got something in writing. And at that the point of that conversation, I hadn't received a letter uh from the principal private secretary. Uh and so we had an
[1:13:25]inconclusive inconclusive conversation. >> Did you raise your any of your concerns with him on the for him to make a judgment to pass this on or anything like that? Was there any conversation
[1:13:36]about the worries that you both seem to have had? I think the foreign secretary should should speak for himself on on his views and and what was uh what was
[1:13:46]said as it were. Um I at that point was doing my best to resolve the situation uh establish you know what I was being asked to do by the top of the government
[1:13:57]and then take the bureaucratic steps necessary uh either way. >> So it was a situation that needed to be resolved during that week. Do you think the process of that week, the due
[1:14:08]diligence part of this is evidence of and and the timings of it is evidence of pressure or undue pressure or evidence of due process being followed?
[1:14:19]>> I'm really sorry, but I I'm not sure I follow you. >> The fact that I mean it's very by your own admission it's very unusual and it is it was an unusual appointment um of political appointment. So it was this
[1:14:30]this whole process tested the system to the limit really and and we're looking at how the system worked in this case but also how what we need to learn for the future but just the evidence of you
[1:14:40]were already told um quite late on in the process due diligence had be done then you were told he was going to be appointed and then it was very publicly announced very quickly and then the so
[1:14:51]all of that the timing of it is that in your opinion evidence of pressure undue pressure or evidence of due process
[1:15:02]being followed at pace. Yes. And you're in a high pressure environment all the time in your role. >> Um the short time scale created the
[1:15:12]pressure as I said said earlier. Um, in terms of the parts that the FCDA written and I was responsible for, I mentioned
[1:15:22]confident interest or vetting they and other decisions. I'm very confident they were taken all bit under pressure properly
[1:15:31]um as I've already been clear the number 10 decision to announce in advance of DV was unusual. And final one for me. Um, with the benefit of hindsight and many
[1:15:42]months to to look at this and think about this whole process, where did the process go wrong? Was it at the that early stage of even considering him or was it the due diligence or was the vetting? Where did the process go wrong
[1:15:52]in your view? >> I I don't have complete knowledge or insight into the process prior to the prime minister's decision. So, I can't
[1:16:03]answer that question. You told us that um it's the normal process to do vetting and then announcement. Um so for comparison purposes, when it came to the
[1:16:12]appointment of Jonathan Powell, uh was he vetted and then announced? >> Uh I I wasn't involved in his appointment. >> Oh, he's he's he's not foreign office.
[1:16:26]>> He's a national security advisor as a cabinet office ro. >> What about when he was special envoy for the British Indian Ocean territories? uh envoys are different and are dealt
[1:16:36]with differently. I honestly can't remember the secrecy on that. So you'd need to ask the department. >> Alex, >> thank you chair. Thank you. So Philip,
[1:16:47]you talked about the um the short time scale causing problems. Um do you think there was a reasonable diplomatic reason why number 10 wanted the appointment
[1:16:55]done by Trump's inauguration? Um, look, I think once the prime minister's decided they want a change of very high-profile ambassador, you do
[1:17:06]want to you don't want to wait too long. You you don't want to get on with making that change. I mean, my own my own view was wasn't essential for man to be there
[1:17:17]by the time uh of the inauguration. Um, always takes a while for US governments to form because of the confirmation process. It's actually quite quick in
[1:17:28]Trump 2 compared to Trump one, but it does take weeks. Um, so I I was personally much less concerned and didn't see that as absolutely essential
[1:17:39]thing. And of course, you know, Karen Pierce was a willing to stay longer and be and be flexible within reason. Uh, and b well respected and and connected
[1:17:49]to the the Trump transition transition team. So yes, I can see entirely the point of getting on with it. Wasn't quite convinced that we had to see the
[1:17:58]20th of January as as a deadline, but that was the one we've been set, you know, very clearly, you know, and communicated by the by the top of the government. >> Did you say that to number 10? >> To be honest, I think, but yeah, I would I would have been clear that we didn't
[1:18:10]have to, but I think in the end they were getting also true that in the end, Lord Mandlesson didn't go until after the inauguration. Um any other external appointments
[1:18:22]including political appointments but others are there examples where somebody has started in post before they've received their their DV um and then had access to those materials?
[1:18:33]>> I'm not aware of an ambassador starting in post uh certainly externally without DB. I mean, I can't speak for history if you know what I mean, but in recent times, no.
[1:18:45]>> Um, and and do you think the argument that because Lord Mandlesson was a privy counselor, he wouldn't need DV clearance was credible at all? >> As I said, my initial reaction that it
[1:18:55]was was that it was odd and insufficient. So, no, which is why I asked for advice, but you know, but we did also pretty quickly settle on he needed DB. Um, and you said higher
[1:19:07]classifications of material that he wouldn't have access to. What level of classification before he received his DV was Mandlesson able able to >> I think it's in the letter, but I think
[1:19:17]it was up to up to secret you.5 page whatever it is um is in there. So
[1:19:26]up up to secret uh was was allowed. So there were there were no briefings he was given above that level of classification before he received vetting.
[1:19:37]Not that I'm aware of. >> Did the intelligence agencies ever share any concerns with you about Mand's appointment or his access to information? >> No.
[1:19:47]>> Thank you. Um, knowing what you know now about Peter Mandlesson's relationship with Epstein
[1:19:55]and everything else, do you think the DB process made the uh or UKSV made the correct decision and the FCDO made the correct decision?
[1:20:05]>> I'm I'm not aware of any of the substance of the DB process. I I can't I genuinely can't answer that question. Does it change your um view on the
[1:20:16]appropriateness of political appointments to ambassadorial positions at all? >> I mean, this one self-evidently hasn't worked out, but you know, Lord Llewellyn
[1:20:25]was a brilliant ambassador to Paris and then then Rome and George Holling did a did a good job in in Cuba and and the prime minister and the foreign they absolutely entitled and it's explicitly
[1:20:36]allowed for in the legislation to make political appointments. So, I I don't have any objection. I mean clearly when I was head of the diplomatic service I was head of the diplomatic profession and inevitably you kind of you know
[1:20:47]you're not quite tra chief you're head of the tribe even if you're not chief trade unionist so you know within reason they're a good idea but you know personally as a diplomat I would argue
[1:20:57]that vast majority of jobs should go to diplomats but they have been successfully used in the past. >> Okay. Um, and finally, do you think the prime minister's statement that full due
[1:21:09]process was followed is a fair description of what happened in Madison's case? >> I, you know, I I'm I'm going to dodge.
[1:21:21]I'm really sorry, but I just actually don't think it's for me to sit here in Yeah, it's not for me to it's for others, you know, including, you know,
[1:21:30]all of you as members of parliament to come to come to a view on that. >> So, as a permanent secretary, would you have said in another case? >> Okay, let me let me I'm not I'm not
[1:21:42]going to answer your question. Let me describe what I've said to you >> in my mind to you today. So, as I've said, I think the processes the FCDO,
[1:21:53]the bit I was responsible for followed up until I stepped down on Sunday the 19th of January. That was that was proper process done at pace as we were
[1:22:04]asked as asked. It was unusual and I wasn't involved in this or sorry, I was involved but not responsible. It was unusual for the announcement to be
[1:22:13]made before he received DB. I've got a question from Edward and from Afa. So, let me go to Edward first. >> Um, I think it sort of follows on from
[1:22:24]what Alex was asking you, Phillip. You're requesting to see the due diligence report. You're flagging to the foreign secretary that
[1:22:36]you have concerns. Um so Ollie in his evidence told us that this was the only time in which the
[1:22:45]security department requested to see him uh in respect to a whether or not to grant clearance. You've told us that during your tenure there was no no
[1:22:56]situation in which you'd met with the security department regarding granting clearance. Is there any precedence for this number of red flags to be raised on an
[1:23:06]appointment? >> I think that's really the impossible. You know, I'm sort of tempted to sort of I don't know. That's a really impossible
[1:23:16]question for me to answer. Uh if you're talking about No, it is because any appointment it you know, so you know, you want me to narrow it down. Previous governments of different political
[1:23:26]persuasions over time have made should I say not the smartest appointments in a whole different areas. But if you ask me if I reframe your question as around an
[1:23:37]appointment to an ambassadorial role during my tenure then the answer is yes or no rather I mean not as whichever whichever agrees with your thrust of
[1:23:47]your question whe that's yes or no. >> Good answer. >> Thank you. Yeah, I just wanted to ask a very quick follow-up question to one of the ones that Alex talked about to do
[1:23:59]with the the types and levels of classified information >> that um Peter Manson saw prior to going out to the US. >> Um
[1:24:09]>> would you have expected the ambassador to the US to be uh briefed on and to know what was in the China order?
[1:24:20]Uh so I'd I'd left unfortunately before the China audit had been completed. So I'm slightly hamstrung by knowing the total the absolute classification of that and quite how you know because some
[1:24:32]of the things about our China policy obviously are very very highly classified. So I I I'm I'm not ducking but I I don't really know. It may be actually there it may be actually there
[1:24:42]was and it also was remember it wasn't complete at that point. It was it wasn't completed before I left. So I my guess but I'm guessing but my guess is
[1:24:52]>> on China Lord Manelson would have been told a fair amount but there would have been some things which were at high classification that he wouldn't wouldn't have been able to know until later but
[1:25:02]I'm I'm I'm I'm summising rather than knowing to be honest with you. I mean, so I completely understand that you said you you're guessing that, but um were you aware that it was expected that
[1:25:14]briefings would include some information about the work that was being undertaken as part of the China audit? I would have expected him to have been
[1:25:25]briefed on the evolution of the government's policy on China. Uh so that he was ready to talk to the US administration about the UK government's
[1:25:37]policy on China. Are you doing his job? Uh and that must have included therefore him being briefed on where the government's audit of China policy got
[1:25:46]to. If that answers your question. So basically yes. >> Thank you. Um and then Dan. >> Uh thank you chair. Uh so Philillip was the correct process followed in the
[1:25:58]dismissal of Ole Robbins. >> Save you save the easy questions for last. Um look I I don't think I don't think I'm
[1:26:10]going to answer that question and it's you know clearly going to be a matter of may may become a matter of formal legal dispute. What I guess what I can say is when I
[1:26:21]was when I was permanent under the secretary there were a number of very serious disciplinary cases during my time
[1:26:29]leading to dismissal and they all uh they all involved uh
[1:26:38]pro some process but yeah only the prime minister Ollie and those involved know what what happened and I I don't so I can't I can't answer your In your cases, you
[1:26:49]would probably see someone suspended and an investigation taking place or something as summarily dismissal as we've seen >> in a in a in a in a serious gross
[1:26:59]misconduct case in the FCDO. Um so for an FCDO member of staff
[1:27:06]however I have a serious um in my time it was going to suspension in at least one case removal from post uh for
[1:27:17]overseas overseas ambassador uh but and then a very short period to do a formal process. >> Thank you. I want to ask about the due diligence report but does anyone else want to come in on
[1:27:28]>> I think wants to come in on the back of that if you don't mind then we'll go back to you. A question to Phillip on the judgment about um the reasons for why um Sir
[1:27:39]Ollie left post, would you have informed number 10 or the prime minister um of the concerns about Peter Mandlesson
[1:27:51]um and those leaked emails um and the emails released by the US Department of Justice um after the decision to sack Mandlesson. If if the view from the
[1:28:00]civil service is that you you don't inform your principal before surely after when all this information is in the public domain would you have intervened?
[1:28:11]>> I I don't think I can answer that question for the reason I sort of gave earlier about not being in the in the moment. I mean I I recognize the prime minister clearly clearly believes
[1:28:21]genuinely he should have been told. Ollie set out for you his his view including if I understood him right that
[1:28:31]he felt he was bound by the rules not to discuss the information from the vetting process although that's now disputed and you had different you had different evidence from from cat little
[1:28:42]so I mean I you know I personally think it's a very good thing that someone of Adrian Fulford's stature has been asked to look into this because we we can't be in this damaging situation again I'm afraid I just actually can't answer your
[1:28:52]question but we do need a proper a look at this because it is very damaging. >> I'd agree uh chair if you can let me ask one final question. This is hugely
[1:29:02]significant decision at this appointment. It had national and international repercussions as well as reputational risk. There's a well publicized friendship with of Jeffrey
[1:29:13]Epstein and the FCDO and the civil services view time and time again has been that they can't intervene because the rules don't let them intervene or to
[1:29:22]take a passive approach. Do you think given everything we know the system should be changed going forward? >> I I don't know the answer to that question. I'm I'm this is why I'm
[1:29:32]pleased that you agent forward who I know from his time when he was I think the first head of the investigation he's the first investigatory powers commissioner and also if I remember
[1:29:42]right has may still do he's been the final appeal for vetting processes so cases and clearly knows a lot about it it's I think he is the right person to to get actually at that at that question
[1:29:54]it's definitely right to look at it >> back to thanks um in the followup to her evidence uh to the committee. Cat little confirmed there was no cabinet office advice ahead of the decision that Morgan
[1:30:05]Mcweeny and Matthew Doyle should follow up questions with Peter Manderson about Epstein. Um, have you any views on whether you thought they were the right people to do that or whether someone independent of the process or someone
[1:30:16]trained in in vetting would have been better to follow up? >> It wasn't it wasn't part the due diligence process. >> Yeah. No. Uh so um what do I think about that? Look,
[1:30:33]there's a political appointment with a process being run out of number 10 and a due diligence conducted by the center in a way that I've already said is not part of normal civil service practices. So I
[1:30:45]think in the end who is doing the questioning uh and whether that's appropriate comes down to who and what weight is being put on those questions and who answers them.
[1:30:56]And so in a sense I I just actually genuinely don't know because it wasn't me making the decision. I wasn't involved is it it wasn't therefore for me to kind of say that's good enough or
[1:31:07]not good enough as the conduit for the questions. I wasn't I wasn't being asked or ever involved in putting any faith in that conflict. Thank you. >> Right. And then John,
[1:31:18]>> thanks chair. Um I mean we've gone around this issue of due diligence
[1:31:25]vetting over and over again. Um, I am surprised that you have never seen
[1:31:34]a DV report, but is that correct? >> The only papers I saw on DV was as my in
[1:31:44]my formal role as the permanent secretary in in uh signing off the outcomes of appeals. So, someone being refused has the right to appeal and
[1:31:55]those papers would come to me, but they did not include vetting files. Aside from those appeal papers, uh, and the forms I filled out for my own vetting, I have never seen vetting papers.
[1:32:07]>> And so, that would align with what Sir Ollie has told us. >> Yes. >> About having only an oral briefing, uh, where we now have two him and E. Colard
[1:32:18]telling us that this was a borderline case. >> Yeah. Although just to repeat what I said earlier, I was never a case was never escalated to me in that way.
[1:32:28]>> And then what this committee uh has been led to believe I think that red flags
[1:32:35]and uh denials of clearance were part of this. I'm just
[1:32:43]the bit I I think you can help us with is the process through which Ollie Robbins finds himself sacked because
[1:32:55]you you've been following this as closely as anybody else. I mean just to phrase the question differently, do you understand why Sir Ollie Robbins has been sacked?
[1:33:07]>> I have not seen the letter he was sent. So I I cannot and I don't speak for him and neither do I speak for the uh for the government. So I I I so I can't I
[1:33:18]can't sit here today and say I know. And I know also Ollie was very clear in his evidence to you in in basically saying he wasn't going to talk about that.
[1:33:30]But in the end, the FCDO is a make recommendation department because it takes responsibility for
[1:33:39]passing clearance. It has power to uh manage risks and to mitigate those risks >> and that is the process that all of the evidence that we've seen uh shows us has
[1:33:51]happened which also aligns with what the prime minister has said that due process was followed. Uh that sounds right to me and you know I I read carefully last
[1:33:59]night um the letter the foreign office sent to you and I wasn't directly involved in anything after the 19th of
[1:34:08]January but it rang true. >> Okay John and then FL is going to ask the last question. Um you'll be aware that a number of former very senior
[1:34:19]civil servants have spoken about how damaging this episode has been on the civil service as a former very experienced permanent secretary and head
[1:34:29]of the diplomatic service. What is your assessment of how this has affected uh the civil service and in particular the diplomatic service? I >> mean so John, thank you for that
[1:34:40]question because I think it's I'm glad you asked. It's a very important one. I think it it's also important to remember the kind of wider context look the the British system of government works best
[1:34:52]when civil servants and ministers including at the highest level work together effectively to deliver the elected government days program but
[1:35:02]respecting they've got slightly different jobs and roles uh uh and responsibilities and whenever that isn't happening and that isn't happening effectively then you're not able to
[1:35:12]deliver as well. So I I do think a situation and you need to have loadbearing relationships at the most senior levels as well. I do
[1:35:23]think there's a a challenge now and I think it's incumbent on on all of us including you know people no longer in government who can can perhaps help from the sidelines to try and get back to a situation where the government of the
[1:35:34]day and the the leaderships of the the government of the day and the civil service of the day have trusting relationships understanding they've got both got different pressures on them different roles under pressure and
[1:35:46]slightly different roles but need to work together uh as a team to deliver for the country and >> the trusting relationship at present do you think is broken down?
[1:35:56]>> Uh I don't like sort of black and white terminology like broken down. I I do think self-evidently that there are now challenges uh at least for some people in in the
[1:36:08]relationships, >> not least people in who think they're in charge of their departments who understand that their permanent secretaries have been told not to tell them things. Um just I've got one more question for
[1:36:24]one more piece of the puzzle which is about going back to access talks that you held um with what were then shadow ministers before the election. Did you
[1:36:34]did the issue of political appointments, the appointment of the ambassador to the US or appointing Peter Mandlesson come up in access talks? Would they have been
[1:36:45]recorded? Um yeah, if you're if you're asking to say were there records of the if your question is were there records of access
[1:36:56]talks? The answer is yes. >> If your question is >> were these aspects recorded? I'm really sorry but I can't actually remember the rules but at the time there was an
[1:37:07]absolute a murder around the contents of the access talks and I'm going to be cautious >> even though I'm no longer a civil servant because I'm still bound by the rules about so I because I can't I'm
[1:37:18]reasonably confident actually the content of access talks is rightly uh not something I can say to the committee I'm afraid but yes they were recorded
[1:37:29]>> good thank you very much um Order. Order. Now, if we can um logistically if Sir Phillip is allowed to to leave first um and