Court Records
Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 F-46 .Off
703 So.2d 1076
703 Sold 1076.22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169
(Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076)
District Court of Appeal of Florida,
Fifth District.
Kimberly BALAS and Teresa Shumate, Petitioners,
v.
Marjorie A. RUZZ0, and Exec., Inc., etc., Re-
spondents.
No. 97-82.
Page I
307Ak3 I k. Relevancy and Materiality.
Most Cited Cases
Party may be permitted to discover evidence that
would be inadmissible at trial, if it would lead to
discovery of relevant evidence. West's F.S.A. RCP
Rule 1.280(b)( I).
(3] Pretrial Procedure 307A O=36.1
Oct. 10, 1997.
As Modified on Grant of Clarification Jan. 2, 1998. e 307A Pretrial Procedure
re.'y dented n O% 2% 1/4 n a • 307All Depositions and Discovery
Plaintiffs brought action against alleged house of 1/Vii). 307A11(A) Discovery in General
prostitution for, inter alia, coercion ofi ras titution.
The Circuit Court, Brevard County, Pound,
307Ak36 Particular Subjects of Disclos- ure
307Ak36.1 k. In General. Most Cited
J., granted in part defendants' motion to compel dis-
covery. Plaintiffs filed petition for writ of certior-
ari. The District Court of Appeal. W. Sharp, J., held
that evidence of plaintiffs' past prostitution and
their revenues relating to such activities was dis-
coverable.
Petition denied.
Harris, J., concurred specially and filed opinion.
West Head notes
[1) Pretrial Procedure 307A 0 31
307A Pretrial Procedure
307AII Depositions and Discovery
307A11(A) Discovery in General
307Ak31 k. Relevancy and Materiality.
Most Cited Cases
Discovery in civil cases must be relevant to subject
matter of case and must be admissible or reason-
ably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.
West's F.S.A. RCP Rule I.280(b)(1).
(2] Pretrial Procedure 307A 1C=a31
307A Pretrial Procedure
307A1I Depositions and Discovery
307A11(A) Discovery in General
Cases
Evidence of plaintiffs' past prostitution and their
revenues relating to such activities, including activ-
ities with alleged house of prostitution against
which they had filed suit, was discoverable, where
plaintiffs brought action not only for coercion of
prostitution, but also for battery, false imprison-
ment, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, violation of their civil rights,
and racketeering. Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, § 40302, 42 U.S.C.A. §
13981; West's F.S.A. §§ 772.014, 796.09; West's
F.S.A. RCP Rule 1.280(b)( I).
*1(176 Richard E. and Heather Fisher Lind-
say, of Spriggs & Tallahassee, for Peti-
tioners.
Mark S. Peters of Amari, Theriac & Eisenmenger,
P.A., Cocoa, for Respondents.
W. SHARP, Judge.
Balas and Shumate petition this court for a writ of
certiorari to review certain portions of the lower
court's order which granted, in part, a motion to
compel discovery filed by respondents Ruzzo and
Exec., Inc. Petitioners argue that those portions de-
part from the essential requirements of law and will
cause them irreparable harm because they will be
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EXHIBIT 41
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 rdtfi 3 8
703 So.2d 1076
703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169
(Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076)
compelled to disclose intimate details of their sexu-
al history. We decline to issue the writ of certiorari.
Bales and Shumate filed suit against Ruzzo and Ex-
ec, Inc., doing business as "The Boardroom." Ac-
cording to Balas and Shumate, The Boardroom op-
erates ostensibly as *1077 a leisure spa but actually
is a house of prostitution. Bales worked at The
Boardroom from December 1993 until February
1996; Shumate worked there from October 1992
until March 1996. Ruzzo, the sole officer and
shareholder of Exec, Inc., collected about fifty to
sixty percent of each employees' earnings from per-
forming sexual acts.
According to Bales and Shumate, Ruzzo exerted
mental and emotional control over her employees
and thus she was able to exploit them as prostitutes.
Ruzzo required her employees to pay her substan-
tial sums of money to attend "metaphysical work-
shop?' conducted by Ruzzo or persons associated
with her. At the work place, the employees were re-
quired to participate in religious and quasi-religious
"circles," rituals and incantations. These practices
were allegedly designed to break down the person-
of the women who worked for Ruzzo and to
dependency and loyalty to herself. At one
time when the earnings of a new employee were
missing and believed to be stolen, Ruzzo required
that the petitioners be strip searched and body cav-
ity searched. Ruzzo caused the petitioners to be-
lieve their continued employment was dependent on
their submission to these searches and that they
might be arrested on felony charges if they refused
to submit to the searches.
Bales and Shumate's second amended complaint
against Ruzzo contains seven counts. Count I is an
action for coercion of prostitution pursuant to sec-
tion 796.09, Florida Statutes. Petitioners allege the
requirement that they perform sexual acts to retain
their employment constitutes inducement and coer-
cion to engage in prostitution. Count H is a claim
for battery for the unwanted and offensive touching
of the petitioners' bodies. Count III is a claim for
false imprisonment for physically confining the pe-
Page 2
titioners against their will. Count IV alleges that re-
spondents' actions constituted an invasion of peti-
tioner? privacy. Count V is a claim for the inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress. Count VI al-
leges a civil rights action-that respondents have vi-
olated petitioners' right to be free from crimes of vi-
olence motivated by gender within the meaning of
42 U.S.C. section 13981. Finally, count VII seeks
civil remedies for criminal practices or racketeering
pursuant to section 772.104, Florida Statutes. The
petitioners claim that they suffered emotional pain,
anguish, humiliation, insult, indignity, loss of self-
esteem, inconvenience, hurt and emotional distress.
They seek an award of general and punitive dam-
ages. among other relief.
The discovery to which the petitioners are being re-
quired to respond is as follows:
1.
Interrogatory 8: Please advise how long have you
been engaged in prostitution....
II.
Interrogatory 22: State with specificity the man-
ner in which the acts as described in your Com-
plaint have materially affected how you interact
with your husband, boyfriend, fiancee' [sic] or
any other individual of the opposite sex.
HI.
Request for Production 30: A copy of any photo-
graphs, movies or videotapes in which you per-
formed sexual acts and/or simulated sexual acts
in exchange for money or other consideration.
IV.
Interrogatory 16: Please list the names, addresses,
telephone numbers and rates of pay for all em-
ployers for which you worked, including the
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703 So.2d 1076,22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169
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nature of the work, during the five years immedi-
ately preceding the date of employment with the
Boardroom and from the date of your termination
with the Boardroom to the present, providing the
names of your immediate supervisors at each
place of employment and the reason for your
leaving each place of employment.
V.
interrogatory 26: Please state your total income
while employed at the Boardroom, and state the
source of that income including any income from
other employment or *1078 income earned from
prostitution other than at the Boardroom.
VI.
Request for Production 34: Business records from
any selfemployment or owned business ventures
in the last 5 years. including any records or list of
customers, "special customer lists" or "sugar
daddy's list."
11][2] Discovery in civil cases must be relevant to
the subject matter of the case and must be admiss-
ible or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible
evidence. See Allstate Insurance Co. v. Lan stoic
655 So.2d 91 (Fla.1995) Amente v. 653
So.2d 1030 (Fla.1995); v. Star ust Cruis-
ers, Inc., 690 So.2d 743 (Ha. 5th DCA 1997). The
concept of relevancy is broader in the discovery
context than in the trial context and a party may be
permitted to discover evidence that would be inad-
missible at trial, if it would lead to the discovery of
relevant evidence. Allstate; Amente. Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.280(b)(1) delineates the proper
scope of discovery:
In General. Parties may obtain discovery regard-
ing any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to
the subject matter of the pending action, whether
it relates to the claim or defense of the party
seeking discovery or the claim or defense of any
other party, including the existence, description,
Page 3
nature, custody, condition, and location of any
books, documents, or other tangible things and
the identity and location of persons having know-
ledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be
inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-
covery of admissible evidence.
Nonetheless, the discovery of certain kinds of in-
formation may cause material injury of an irrepar-
able nature. This includes the "cat-out-of-the-bag"
material that could be used to injure another person
or party outside the context of the litigation, materi-
al protected by privilege, trade secrets or work
product. Discovery was never intended to be used
as a tactical tool to harass, embarrass or annoy
one's adversary. Rather, pretrial discovery was im-
plemented to simplify the issues in a case, to elim-
inate the elements of surprise, to encourage the set-
tlement of cases, to avoid the cost of litigation, and
to achieve a balanced search for the truth to ensure
a fair trial. Elkins v. Sylcen, 672 So.2d 517 (Fla.1996).
Here the petitioners argue that the information
sought to be discovered regarding prostitution and
their sexual activities was propounded solely to em-
ban-ass them and to invade their right to privacy.
The petitioners also claim that this information is
privileged under section 796.09 and is not calcu-
lated to lead to evidence which would be admiss-
ible at trial.
Section 796.09 provides a person with a civil cause
of action for compensatory and punitive damages
against anyone who coerces that person into prosti-
tution, who coerces that person to remain in prosti-
tution, or who uses coercion to collect or receive
any part of that person's earnings derived from
prostitution. In the course of litigation under this
section, any transaction about which a plaintiff test-
ifies or produces evidence does not subject the
plaintiff to criminal prosecution or to any penalty or
forfeiture. In addition, any testimony or evidence or
any information produced by the plaintiff or wit-
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 PW4 s1
703 So.2d 1076
703 So.2d 1076.22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly DI69
(Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076)
ness for the plaintiffs cannot be used against the
plaintiffs or witness in any other investigation or
proceeding, except one for perjury.
Section 796.09(5) specifically provides that it is not
a defense that the plaintiff was paid or otherwise
compensated for prostitution, that the plaintiff had
engaged in prostitution prior to any involvement
with the defendant or that the plaintiff made no at-
tempt to escape from the defendant. Section
796.09(6) provides that convictions for prostitution
or prostitution-related offenses are inadmissible for
the purpose of attacking the plaintiffs' credibility.
This legislation was the result of the Florida Su-
preme Court Gender Bias Study Commission,
which conducted an extensive investigation of pros-
titution in this state. The Commission's activities
included interviews with law enforcement and cor-
rections personnel,*1079 judges, public defenders,
prosecutors, drug rehabilitation counselors, social
workers, medical personnel, prostitutes, clients and
pimps. The Commission found prostitution to be
prevalent and uniform throughout the state and law
enforcement largely unable to deter it under pre-
vailing social attitudes and judicial practices. The
Commission further found that prostitutes are often
victims of economic, physical, and psychological
coercion, that most persons do not chose to become
prostitutes, but do so to survive, and that ninety
percent of street prostitutes, both adult and chil-
dren, are controlled by pimps who use a variety of
coercive methods to maintain this control. The
Commission determined that clients and pimps are
rarely prosecuted and, when prosecuted, receive
light sentences; whereas prostitutes, who are mainly
females, are frequently prosecuted and receive
harsher treatment in the courts. The Commission
recommended changes in the methods of interven-
tion in prostitution from punitive to therapeutic,
changes in the law to require more equal treatment
by the courts of the prostitute in relation to the cli-
ent and the pimp and to lessen the incentive to
traffic in human flesh by giving the prostitute ac-
cess to the judicial system without first having to be
arrested.
Page 4
Under section 796.09, the petitioners' prior involve-
ment in prostitution and their earnings from prosti-
tution would be irrelevant. Hence discovery should
not be permitted because such information would
not be admissible at trial nor would it be reasonably
calculated to lead to evidence ultimately admissible
at trial. Even though the scope of discovery is gen-
erally quite broad. section 796.09 is designed to en-
courage prostitutes to sue their pimps. Thus the
usually broad scope of discovery may be constric-
ted so that prostitutes will not be embarrassed, har-
assed or hindered in their actions.
[31 Had the petitioners brought their lawsuit against
Ruzzo and The Boardroom only under section
796.09, evidence of petitioners' past prostitution,
including with the Boardroom, and their earnings
relating to such activities, may not have been dis-
coverable. However, the petitioners filed a multi-
count complaint for compensatory and punitive
damages, alleging numerous causes of action
against the respondents. These other causes carry
no such protection from discovery. Since the in-
formation sought by discovery may be relevant or
may lead to the discovery of admissible evidence in
one or more of these other causes of action or to
determination of damages, we cannot conclude that
the trial court departed from the essential
ments of law in granting this discovery. See
v. TlB Bank of the Keys, 687 So.2d 895 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1997) (by alleging fraud as well as breach of
contract, purchaser placed at issue her reliance on
venders' assertions, the veracity of financial docu-
ments she submitted to the vender, and the state of
her mental health, including memory problems she
was experiencing at the time of the alleged tortious
conduct, thus deposition questions concerning her
state of mind were relevant).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari DENIED.
THOMPSON, J., concurs.
HARRIS, J., concurs specially with opin-
ion.HARRIS, Judge, concurring specially:
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703 So.2d 1076
703 So.2d 1076,22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly DI69
(Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076)
There is a temptation in cases such as this to inquire
which, the pot or the kettle, is imbued with the
darker hue. Indeed that may ultimately be the ques-
tion uppermost in the jurors' minds. But the issue
presently before us is simply whether the pot, in or-
der to establish the parties' comparative complex-
ion, may discover the historical condition and the
inherent characteristics of the kettle.
We are here involved with parties that the limited
record before us indicates were co-conspirators in a
joint effort to violate Florida's laws against prosti-
tution. The defendants are the owner/operators of a
"social club" whose primary service is prostitution;
the plaintiffs are employees of the club who
provide such services. The employees are suing the
owner/operators for, among other counts, taking ad-
vantage of their vulnerabilities ("coercing" them to
be prostitutes) through manipulation and exploita-
tion. In order to prepare a defense to the action, de-
fendants have filed certain interrogatories for the
employees to answer. These interrogatories*1080
request such information as how long the employ-
ees have been engaged in prostitution; how the em-
ployees have been affected by the defendants' con-
duct; copies of photographs, movies, and video-
tapes in which the employees have performed sexu-
al acts or simulated sexual acts; the names of previ-
ous employers and previous rates of pay; and a
statement of income received from defendants.
These interrogatories survived the employees' ob-
jections. I agree certiorari should be denied.
The employees' primary cause of action is based on
section 796.09(1), Florida Statutes, which provides:
(I) A person has a cause of action for compensatory
and punitive damages against:
:a) A person who coerces that person into prostitu-
tion;
',b) A person who coerces that person to remain in
prostitution, or
:c) A person who uses coercion to collect or receive
Page 5
any part of that person's earnings derived from
prostitution.
The employees resist discovery of their past prosti-
tution or their past or present earning experience on
the basis of subparagraph 5 of section 796.09:
5) It does not constitute a defense to a complaint
under this section that:
a) The plaintiff was paid or otherwise compensated
for acts of prostitution;
b) The plaintiff engaged in acts of prostitution pri-
or to any involvement with the defendant ...
But the question before us is not whether prior acts
of prostitution (or the receipts of earnings there-
from) which might be revealed by answering the in-
terrogatories could be used as a defense to the com-
plaint, but rather whether evidence of such conduct
or such earnings would be relevant in determining
whether the employees were, in fact, "coerced" into
prostitution, into remaining prostitutes, or into shar-
ing the proceeds of their services with defendants.
The relevancy of this information depends, of
course, on what constitutes coercion.
If we apply the definition of "coercion" which is
commonly accepted, then the relevancy of the re-
quested information is apparent and this appeal has
no merit at all. Webster defines "coercion" as: (1)
to restrain or dominate by force, (2) to compel an
act or choice, or (3) to enforce or bring about by
force or threat. In sexual battery cases, the legis-
lature has adopted the common meaning of the
word "coercion" and has even placed limits on it. It
has provided that consent will not be recognized if
submission is coerced by threats of force or viol-
ence if the victim reasonably believes the perpetrat-
or has the present ability to execute the threat?"
Consent also will not be recognized if submission is
coerced by a threat of retaliation against the victim
or another if the victim reasonably believes that the
perpetrator has the ability to execute the threat in
the future." And in sexual battery cases, the le-
gislature has vitiated what might otherwise be con-
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703 So.2d 1076
703 So.2d 1076, 22 Fla. L. Weekly D2375.23 Fla. L. Weekly D169
(Cite as: 703 Sold 1076)
sidered as consensual if one exploits a known phys-
ical or mental weakness of the victim to achieve his
or her goal or takes advantage of one who is phys-
ically helpless or involuntarily intoxicated."
Therefore, even in sexual battery cases, before co-
ercion or exploitation will vitiate consent, the free
will of the victim must be overcome by force or
threat or some unfortunate circumstance suffered
by the victim.
FNI. Section 794.011(4)(b), Florida Stat-
utes.
FN2. Section 794.011(4)(c), Florida Stat-
utes.
FN3. Section 794.011(4)(a),(d),(e), and (I),
Florida Statutes.
But then we get to the definition of "coercion" con-
tained in section 796.09(3):
:3) As used in this section, the term "coercion"
means any practice of dominion, restraint, or in-
ducement for the purpose of or with the reason-
ably foreseeable effect of causing another person
to engage in or remain in prostitution or to relin-
quish earnings derived from prostitution, and in-
cludes, but is not limited to:
:a) Physical force or threats of physical force
:b) Physical or mental torture.
:c) Kidnapping.
*1081 (d) Blackmail.
,'e) Extortion or claims of indebtedness.
•
'5) Threats of legal complaint or report of delin-
quency.
,'g) Threat to interfere with parental rights or re-
sponsibilities, whether by judicial or administrat-
ive action or otherwise.
:h) Promise of legal benefit.
Page 6
:1) Promise of greater financial rewards.
1,j) Promise of marriage.
:k) Restraint of Speech or communications with
others.
',/ ) Exploitation of a condition of developmental
disability, cognitive limitation, affective disorder,
or substance dependency.
1,m) Exploitation of victimization by sexual abuse.
',n) Exploitation of pornographic performance.
:0) Exploitation of human needs for food, shelter,
safety, or affection.
The definition urged by the employees herein is the
"promise of a greater financial reward." Whether
the requested information is relevant to the issue of
coercion in this case will depend on what the legis-
lature intended by subsection (I) in the meaning of
"coercion."
I agree with Judge Altenbemd's thoughtful analysis
in State v. Brigham, 694 So.2d 793 (1997):
There can be no dispute that the legislature's unusu-
al definition of "percent" is not a common dic-
tionary definition. This is perhaps an appropriate
case in which to remind ourselves of Learned
Hand's famous observation that a "mature and de-
veloped jurisprudence" does not "make a fortress
out of the dictionary."
But even so, one would expect some nexus between
the commonly accepted meaning of a word and the
definition of that word ascribed by the legislature.
If, for example, the legislature defined "canine" as
including cats, although one might, jurispruden-
tially speaking, expect to hear a meow emanate
from a Great Dane, the courts should nevertheless
closely examine the legislative history to see if that
is really what the legislature intended. The court in
Young v. O'Keefe, 246 Iowa 1182, 69 N.W.2d 534,
537 (1955). stated this principle as follows: "But
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703 So.2d 1076
703 So.2d 1076,22 Ha. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly DI69
(Cite as: 703 Sold 1076)
before a definition is construed so as to expand the
meaning of a well-known word to include its ant-
onym ..., the intention of the to that ef-
fect must be clear." As Judge observed in
Carron v. Roger Bohn, D.C., P.A., 5 So.2d 814,
818 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991):
It is our primary duty to give effect to legislative
intent and, if a literal interpretation of a statute
leads to unreasonable results, then we should ex-
ercise our power to interpret reason and logic to it.
Unfortunately, it is apparent that in enacting this le-
gislation, the legislature has, without redefining
the terms for the purposes of this legislation, of-
ten used terms with commonly accepted mean-
ings for purposes at great variance from those
commonly accepted meanings.
In our case, the legislature did define the term for
the purpose of the act. But because the term
(coercion) as so defined can be interpreted two
ways-one consistent with the commonly accepted
meaning and one at variance-we should not accept
the "antonym" unless such legislative intent is
clear. A free will decision, even if based on a hope
of financial gain, is the opposite of a coerced de-
cision.
The employees urge that the mere promise of a
greater reward brings them within the act. But if the
mere promise of a greater reward is sufficient to es-
tablish coercion, then anyone who makes a volun-
tary and reasoned exercise of free will motivated by
the hope of economic gain has been coerced. This
definition removes the element of compulsion im-
plicit in the commonly accepted meaning of coer-
cion and substitutes therefor the mere desire for fin-
ancial gain. The employees herein assert that since
they were offered "a greater financial reward" for
providing the services performed by them through
defendants' establishment, they were coerced into
their prostitution activities. This equates the giving
Page 7
of an opportunity to make a decision with the coer-
cion of that decision. But subsection (I) can also
mean •1082 that the promise of a greater reward is
coercion only if such promised reward is sufficient
to overcome one's natural revulsion to selling one's
body for money. If there is no such revulsion, there
can be no coercion. Becoming a prostitute only be-
cause one likes the hours and wages or "because it
beats the heck out of working for a living" simply
should not meet the test of section 796D9(1).
At oral argument herein, it was suggested without
contradiction, that at least one of the employees has
a college degree and gave up a well-paying, legit-
imate job in order to engage in this profession for
the greater reward. Section 796.09 does not appear
to be a general prostitute's relief act. It is based on a
report by the Gender Bias Study Commission which
recommended the equalization of treatment in rela-
tion to the prostitute, the client and the "pimp." It is
based on the premise that prostitutes are generally
victims of economic, physical, and psychological
coercion and choose prostitution in order to sur-
vive. Further, the Commission was concerned that
90 percent of the street prostitutes are controlled by
"pimps" who use a variety of coercive methods to
maintain control. It seems clear that the legislature
was not intending to depart from the precepts of the
commonly understood meaning of "coercion" and
to redefine it to include both free will decisions and
compelled decisions.. The interpretation urged by
the employees seems at variance with the stated
goal of the legislature and the Gender Bias Com-
mission.
Since there is no cause of action provided for one
who makes a reasoned and voluntary exercise of
their free will to enter or continue in the profession
solely for financial rewards (assuming "coercion" is
given the definition more consistent with its com-
monly accepted meaning and assuming that my in-
terpretation of legislative intent is correct), coercion
becomes the critical issue in the trial of such action.
The interrogatories propounded by defendants ap-
pear relevant to the issue of coercion.
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Case 9:08-cv-80119-KAM Document 67-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/02/2009 PPatitg§
703 So.2d 1076
703 So.2d 1076, 22 Ha. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla. L. Weekly D169
(Cite as: 703 So.2d 1076)
This is a case of first impression based on a relat-
ively new statute. As indicated, the legislative his-
tory of the new law suggests that the statute is de-
signed to assist those who were forced to enter
prostitution in order to keep a roof over their heads
or food on their table. It does not appear to be in-
tended to aid those who voluntarily enter the pro-
on in order to drive a Mercedes instead of a
M. The limited record before us indicates that
even beginning employees of the defendants (those
who do not have an established clientele) bring in
$700 a day and can keep 50% of their earnings.
Based on a five-day work week, this would reflect
an income of $87,500 a year even with a two week
vacation. And the employees herein are not begin-
ners.
There is no indication that the legislature intended
to legalize prostitution or to make it a respectable
profession. It merely intended to place the prosti-
tute on the same footing with the client and the
"pimp." If a prostitute voluntarily makes the de-
cision to participate, free from force, intimidation.
or disadvantageous circumstance, then he or she is
on the same footing as the other participants and
should be treated the same.
Although it might well serve a legitimate public
purpose to permit the cannibalistic demise of such
enterprises (and I am not unsympathetic with this
view), that does not appear to be the policy behind
the current statute. Therefore, in cases where coer-
cion is not present (and this may or may not be
one), the court should continue its tradition of not
interceding in civil conflicts involving transactions
that are either illegal or are against public policy.
See Wechirkr v Novak, 157 Fla. 703, 26 So.2d 884
(1946); v. Ratiner, 462 So.2d 1157, 1160
(Fla. 3d DCA 1984), rev. denied, 472 So.2d 1182
(Fla.1985) ("An action may lie for interference with
an unenforceable contract and even perhaps a void-
able contract. No such cause of action lies for inter-
ference with a contract void as against public policy
(another's representation of a client obtained by a
doctor/lawyer's illegal personal injury solicitation
Page 8
in the hospital) and which makes one who is a party
thereto, as the appellant in the instant case, guilty of
a criminal act for entering into such an agree- meat")
We are not asked in this proceeding to rule on the
admissibility of the discovered information as evid-
ence at the trial of this cause. We are to determine
only if the information might lead to admissible
evidence. Even *1083 though we deny the Writ I
suggest we certify the following question:
DOES ONE, FREE FROM FORCE, INTIMIDA-
TION, OR DISADVANTAGEOUS CIRCUM-
STANCE. WHO MAKES A REASONED DE-
CISION TO BECOME OR REMAIN A PROSTI-
TUTE OR TO SHARE THE PROCEEDS
THEREOF BECAUSE OF A PROMISE OF A
GREATER FINANCIAL REWARD HAVE A
CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER SECTION
796.09(1), FLORIDA STATUTES?
ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING, FOR CLARI-
FICATION, FOR CERTIFICATION, AND FOR RE-
HEARING EN BANC
W. SHARP, Judge.
Petitioners Balas and Shumate have filed motions
for rehearing, clarification and certification. We
deny the motions in full except for one regard. We
delete the sentence in the last full paragraph of the
opinion which reads: "These other causes of action
carry no such protection from discovery."
Motion for Clarification GRANTED as stated
above; Motion for Rehearing and Certification
DENIED.
HARRIS and THOMPSON, .11., concur.
Fla.App. 5 Dist.,1997.
Balas v. Ruzzo
703 So.2d 1076, 22 Ha. L. Weekly D2375, 23 Fla.
L. Weekly D169
END OF DOCUMENT
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