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Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 Page 1 of 8 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
CASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-MARRAY 
JANE DOE NO. 3, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFREY EPSTEIN 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Defendant Jeffrey Epstein, pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure and Rule 7.1(A) of the Local Rules for the Southern District of 
Florida, moves to dismiss Count I of plaintiffs complaint,' and states as follows: 
' The time to answer the remaining allegations of the complaint is tolled pending the Court's 
ruling on the present motion. See Beaulieu v. Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of W. Fla., No. 
3:07cv30/RV/EMT, 2007 WL 2020161, * 2 (N.D. Fla. July 9, 2007) (holding that defendant's 
partial motion to dismiss "automatically extends its time to answer . . . until after the court has 
ruled on [its] motion to dismiss"); Finnegan v. Univ. of Rochester Med. Ctr., 180 F.R.D. 247, 
249 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (concluding "that the filing of a motion that only addresses part of a 
complaint suspends the time to respond to the entire complaint, not just to the claims that are the 
subject of the motion"); v. Berry College, Inc., No. Civ.A. 4:96CV338-HLM, 1997 WL 
579166, *1 (N.D. Ga. July 3, 1997) (noting that there is significant case law to support the 
position that "when a defendant files a Rule I2(b) motion to dismiss, addressing only some of 
the claims contained in the plaintiffs complaint, the defendant is not required to file an answer 
until the court rules on the motion to dismiss"). 
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Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 Page 2 of 8 
CASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-MARRA/ 
ALLEGATIONS IN PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT 
This action arises out of the alleged assault of the plaintiff. According to the 
allegations in her complaint, the plaintiff went to Mr. Epstein's house to give him 
"a massage for monetary compensation" (Compl. ¶ 12), where Mr. Epstein 
allegedly assaulted her "in violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutes." 
(Compl. ¶ 18). 
The plaintiff tries to assert a claim for sexual assault (Compl. ¶¶ 15-19.) 
This theory of liability, however, cannot be supported by the allegations in the 
complaint. In fact, even if everything in the complaint were true, recovery against 
Jeffrey Epstein, for Count I, under any formulation, is impossible under Florida 
law. Accordingly, this count must be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
A motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) should be granted when a 
court cannot identify "each of the material elements necessary to sustain a 
recovery under some viable legal theory." Snow v. DirectTV, Inc., 450 F.3d 1314, 
1320 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Roe v. Aware Woman Cm For Choice, Inc., 253 
F.3d 678, 684 (11th Cir. 2001)). Moreover, a court should dismiss a complaint 
"when, on the basis of a dispositive issue of law, no construction of the factual 
allegations will support a cause of action." Marshall County Bd. of Educ. v. 
Marshal County Gas Dist, 992 F.2d 1171, 1174 (11th Cir. 1993). "[T]o survive a 
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Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 Page 3 of 8 
CASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must do more than merely state legal conclusions; 
they are required to allege some specific factual bases for those conclusions . . . ." 
Holt v. Crist, No. 06-14617, 2007 WL 1156938, *2 (11th Cir. Apr. 19, 2007). As 
such, "conclusory allegations, unwarranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions 
masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal." Snow, 450 F.3d at 1320. 
I. Count I Fails to State a Cause of Action For Assault Recognized by 
Florida Law. 
The plaintiff attempts to plead a cause of action against Mr. Epstein for 
"sexual assault" based on a "violation of Chapter 800 of the Florida Statutess2 for 
the "lewd and lascivious acts committed by Epstein upon Jane Doe." (Compl. ¶ 
18.) Plaintiff cannot assert a cause of action for "violation of Chapter 800, Florida 
Statutes" because there is no private right of action under that Chapter. See 
generally Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Plaza Materials Corp., 908 So. 2d 360, 374 
(Fla. 2005) (observing that "not every statutory violation carries a civil remedy") 
(citing Villazon v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 843 So. 2d 842, 852 (Fla. 
2003)). See also, e.g., Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Ferre, 636 F. Supp. 970 (S.D. 
Fla. 1985) (M, C.J.) (holding that violation of Florida's criminal extortion 
statute does not give rise to a civil cause of action for damages). 
2 Chapter 800, Florida Statutes, is entitled, "Lewdness; Indecent Exposure." 
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Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 Page 4 of 8 
CASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-MARRA/ 
Where a plaintiff brings a civil action pursuant to a criminal statute that 
provides no civil remedy, her complaint is properly dismissed for failure to state a 
cause of action. See Mantooth v. Richards, 557 So. 2d 646, 646 (Fla. 4th DCA 
1990) (per curiam) (affirming dismissal of plaintiff's claim for parental kidnapping 
where "the mentioned statutes concern only criminal violations and do not afford 
a civil remedy") (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
Even if Chapter 800 provided a civil remedy (which it does not) the statute 
does not apply to the plaintiff. The statute prohibits sexual activity with or lewd or 
lascivious offenses against "a person . . . less than 16 years of age." § 800.04, Fla. 
Stat. (2008) (emphasis added). By her own admission, the plaintiff was "then 16 
years old." (Compl. ¶ 8.) (emphasis added). Plainly, the plaintiff falls outside of 
the scope of the statute's protection. Accordingly, the plaintiff's claim for sexual 
assault against Mr. Epstein, pursuant to a violation of Chapter 800, Florida 
Statutes, must be dismissed. 
Should the Court look beyond the plain language of the plaintiffs complaint 
and construe Count I as a claim for common-law assault, that claim would also 
fail. As the court explained in Lay v. Kremer, 411 So. 2d 1347, 1349 (Fla. 1st 
DCA 1982), an assault is "an intentional, unlawful offer of corporal injury to 
another by force, or force unlawfully directed toward another under such 
circumstances as to create a fear of imminent peril, coupled with the apparent 
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CASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-MARRA/ 
present ability to effectuate the attempt." An assault thus requires "an affirmative 
act—a threat to use force, or the actual exertion of force." v. AtI Fed. 
Say. & Loan Assoc., 454 So. 2d 52, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984) (affirming dismissal of 
assault claim where there was no affirmative act). 
In this case, there is no such affirmative act. In fact, the plaintiff does not 
allege that Mr. Epstein touched her or even spoke to her. Nor does the plaintiff 
allege that she was placed in any fear of imminent peril. See Gatto v. Publix 
Supermarket, Inc., 387 So. 2d 377, 379 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980) (holding that where 
there was no evidence to show that Gatto was placed in fear of imminent peril, 
there was no assault). Instead, the plaintiff merely makes the conclusory allegation 
that Mr. Epstein "sexually assaulted [her] during the massage" without alleging 
any facts to support this allegation. This conclusory allegation is insufficient. 
Accordingly, because the plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of action for 
assault recognized in Florida, Count I against Mr. Epstein must be dismissed. 
Conclusion 
For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant Jeffrey Epstein respectfully 
requests that Count I of the plaintiff's complaint be dismissed. 
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Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 Page 6 of 8 
CASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-MARRA 
Respectfully submitted, 
TEIN, P.L. 
3059 Grand Avenue, Suite 340 
Coconut Grove, Florida 33133 
Tel: [Phone Redacted] 
Fax: [Phone Redacted] 
By: /s/ Michael R. Tein 
GUY A. 
Fla. Bar No. 623740 
MICHAEL R. TEIN 
Fla. Bar No. 993522 
[Email Redacted] 
ATTERBURY, GOLDBERGER & 
WEISS, P.A. 
250 Australian Avenue South, Suite 1400 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
Tel. [Phone Redacted] 
Fax. [Phone Redacted] 
By: Jack A. Goldberger 
Fla. Bar No. 262013 
[Email Redacted] 
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTHER & 
COLEMAN, LLP 
515 N. Flagler Drive, Suite 400 
West Palm Beach, Florida 33401 
Tel. [Phone Redacted] 
Fax. [Phone Redacted] 
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Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 Page 7 of 8 
CASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-MARRA/JOHNSON 
By: Robert D. Critton, Esq. 
Fla. Bar No. 224162 
[Email Redacted] 
Michael J. Pike, Esq. 
Fla. Bar No. 617296 
[Email Redacted] 
Attorneys for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH LOCAL RULE 7.1 
Undersigned counsel has conferred in good faith with counsel for the 
plaintiff, who opposes the relief requested in this motion. 
Is/ Michael R. Tein 
Michael R. Tein 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on September 4, 2008, I electronically filed the 
foregoing document with the Clerk of Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the 
foregoing document is being served this day on all individuals on the following 
service list via transmission of Notices of Electronic Filing generated by CM/ECF. 
/s/ Michael R. Tein 
Michael R. Tein 
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Case 9:08-cv-80232-KAM Document 35 Entered on FLSD Docket 09/04/2008 Page 8 of 8 
CASE NO.: 08-80232-CIV-MARRA/ 
Service List 
Jeffrey M. Herman, Esq. 
Stuart S. Mermelstein, Esq. 
Adam D. Horowitz, Esq. 
Herman & Mermelstein, P.A. 
18205 Biscayne Blvd, Suite 2218 
Miami, Florida 33160 
Fax: [Phone Redacted] 
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