Court Records
Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 15-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/12/2010 Page 1 of 16
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
CASE NO. 10-80309-CIV-
JANE DOE No. 103,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFFERY EPSTEIN,
Defendant.
DEFENDANT EPSTEIN'S AMENDED MOTION TO DISMISS,COUNT
VI & FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT & TO STRIKE DIRECTED
TO PLAINTIFF JANE DOE NO. 103'S COMPLAINT 'dated 2/23/20101
Defendant, JEFFREY EPSTEIN, ("EPSTEIN"), by and through his undersigned
counsel, files this Amended Motion To Dismiss Count VI, & Motion For More Definite
Statement & Strike Directed To PlaintiffJANE DOE 103's Complaint. Defendant moves
to dismiss Count Six of Plaintiff JANE DOE 103's Complaint for failure to state a cause
of action, as specified herein. Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P. (2009); Local Gen. Rule 7.1
(S.D. Fla. 2009). Defendant further moves for More Definite Statement and to Strike.
Rule 12(e) and (f), In support of his motion, Defendant states:
The Complaint attempts to allege 6 counts, all of which are purportedly brought
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255 — Civil Remedies for Personal Injuries. Count Six is subject
to dismissal because the predicate act relied upon by Plaintiff for her claims did not come
into effect until July 27, 2006, well after the conduct alleged by Plaintiff occurred. The
More Definite Statement requested is for Plaintiff to allege her date of birth in that her
being a minor has significance in the claims she alleges.
"A"
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Supporting Memorandum of Law
Principles of Statutory Interpretation
It is well settled that in interpreting a statute, the court's inquiry begins with the
plain and unambiguous language of the statutory text. CBS. Inc. v. Prime Time 24
Venture, 245 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001); U.S. v. Castroneves, 2009 WL 528251, *3 (S.D.
Fla. 2009), citing Reeves v. Astrue, 526 F.3d 732, 734 (11th Cir. 2008); and V.
Husband, 376 F.Supp.2d at 610 ("When interpreting a statute, [a court's] inquiry begins
with the text."). "The Court must first look to the plain meaning of the words, and
scrutinize the statute's `language, structure, and purpose.'" Id. In addition, in construing
a statute, a court is to presume that the legislature said what it means and means what it
said, and not add language or give some absurd or strained interpretation. As stated in
CBS. Inc., supra at 1228 — "Those who ask courts to give effect to perceived legislative
intent by interpreting statutory language contrary to its plain and unambiguous meaning
are in effect asking courts to alter that language, and `[c]ourts have no authority to alter
statutory language.... We cannot add to the terms of [the] provision what Congress left
out.' Merritt, 120 F.3d at 1187." See also Dodd v. U.S., 125 S.Q. 2478 (2005); 73
Am.Jur.2d Statutes §124.
Title 18 of the U.S.C. is entitled "Crimes and Criminal Procedure." §2255 is
contained in "Part I. Crimes, Chap. 110. Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of
Children." 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2002)', is entitled Civil remedy for personal injuries, and
provides:
1 The above quoted version of 18 U.S.C. §2255 was the same beginning in 1999 until
amended in 2006, effective July 27, 2006.
2
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(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242, 2243, 2251,
2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers
personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate United
States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as
described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages
of no less than $50,000 in value.
(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the complaint
is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or in the case of a
person under a legal disability, not later than three years after the disability.
See endnote 1 hereto for statutory text as amended in 2006, effective July 27,
2006. Prior to the 2006 amendments, the version of the statute quoted above was in
effect beginning in 1999.1
All of Plaintiff's allegations of abuse occurred between January 2004 and May
2005 (par. 18), well prior to 18 U.S.C. §2255 being amended.
Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiff's reliance on the amended version of 18 U.S.C. V255, such reliance is
improper. The version of Defendant's position that 18 U.S.C. 82255 in effect
prior to the 2006 amendments applies to this action, and therefore Count Six is
required to be dismissed as it relies on a predicate act that was not in effect at
the time of the alleged conduct. 23
Plaintiff does not specifically allege in her Complaint on which version of 18
U.S.C. §2255 she is relying. However, in Count Six of her Complaint, ¶50, she alleges
that Defendant "knowingly engaged in a child exploitation enterprise, as defined in 18
U.S.C. §2252A(g)(2), in violation of 18 U.S.C. §2252A(g)(l)." §2252A is one of the
2 Points (2) and (3) are addressed together as the legal arguments overlap.
3 In other §2255 actions filed against Defendant, Defendant has previously asserted the position
that 18 U.S.C. §2255's creates a single cause of action on behalf of a plaintiff against a
defendant, as opposed to multiple causes of action on a per violation basis or as opposed to an
allowance of a multiplication of the statutory presumptive minimum damages or 'actual
damages." EPSTEIN asserts his position regarding the single recovery of damages in order to
properly preserve all issues pertaining to the proper application of §2255 for appeal. EPSTEIN
will fully honor his obligations as set forth in the Non-Prosecution Agreement with the United
States Attorney's Office; principally, as related to the claims made in this case by Jane Doe 103,
the obligations as set forth in paragraph 8 of that Agreement. In particular, EPSTEIN will not
contest the allegation that he committed at least one predicate offense as alleged by Jane Doe
103.
3
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specified predicate acts under 18 U.S.C. §2255. However, subsection (g) of §2252 was
not added to the statute until 2006. Thus, to the extent that Plaintiff is relying on the
amended version of 18 U.S.C. §2255, such reliance is improper and Count Six is required
to be dismissed as it relies on a statutory predicate act that did not exist at the time of the
alleged conduct.
According to Plaintiff's allegations, the alleged conduct of EPSTEIN directed to
Plaintiff occurred beginning in January 2004 until approximately May 2005. In Count
VI, in attempting to assert a claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §2255, Plaintiff is relying on
subsection, (g)(1) and (2), of the criminal statute 18 U.S.C. §2252A as the requisite
predicate act. Subsection (g) of §2252A was not even in existence at the time of the
alleged conduct. Subsection (g) was enacted in 2006, effective July 27, 2006. See 2006
Amendments; Pub.L. 109-248, § 701, added subsec. (g). 18 U.S.C.A. § 2252A. As
discussed more fully below herein, reliance on subsection (g) violates the well entrenched
constitutional principles against retroactivity, and, thus, Count VI is required to be
dismissed.
The statute in effect during the time the alleged conduct occurred is 18 U.S.C.
§2255 (2005) — the version in effect prior to the 2006 amendment, eff. Jul. 27, 2006,
(quoted above), and having an effective date of 1999 through July 26, 2006. See
endnote 1 hereto. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendant's conduct occurred during
the time period from the age of 17, January 2004 until approximately May 2005.
Complaint, ¶¶17, 18. Thus, the version in effect in 2004-2005 of 18 U.S.C. §2255
applies.
4
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It is an axiom of law that "retroactivity is not favored in the law." Bowen, 488
U.S., at 208, 109 S.Ct., at 471 (1988). As eloquently stated in Landgraf v. USI Film
Products 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1497, 511 U.S. 244, 265-66 (1994):
... the presumption against retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our
jurisprudence, and embodies a legal doctrine centuries older than our Republic.
Elementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should have an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct accordingly; settled
expectations should not be lightly disrupted.FNIF For that reason, the "principle that the
legal effect of conduct should ordinarily be assessed under the law that existed when the
conduct took place has timeless and universal appeal." Kaiser, 494 U.S., at 855, 110
S.Ct., at 1586 (SCALIA, J., concurring). In a free, dynamic society, creativity in both
commercial and artistic endeavors is fostered by a rule of law that gives people
confidence about the legal consequences of their actions.
FN18. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191, 112 S.Ct. 1105,
1112, 117 L.Ed.2d 328 (1992) ("Retroactive legislation presents problems of
unfairness that are more serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because
it can deprive citizens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions");
[Further citations omitted].
It is therefore not surprising that the antiretroactivity principle finds expression in
several provisions of our Constitution. The Ex Post Facto Clause flatly prohibits
retroactive application of penal legislation.FNI9 Article I, § 10, cl. 1, prohibits States
from passing another type of retroactive legislation, laws "impairing the Obligation of
Contracts." The Fifth Amendments Takings Clause prevents the Legislature (and other
government actors) from depriving private persons of vested property rights except for
a "public use" and upon payment of "just compensation." The prohibitions on "Bills of
Attainder" in Art. 1, §§ 9-10, prohibit legislatures from singling out disfavored persons
and meting out summary punishment for past conduct. See, e.g., United States v.
381 U.S. 437, 456-462, 85 S.Ct. 1707, 1719-1722, 14 L.Ed.2d 484 (1965). The
Due Process Clause also protects the interests in fair notice and repose that may be
compromised by retroactive legislation; a justification sufficient to validate a statute's
prospective application under the Clause "may not suffice" to warrant its retroactive
application. Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 17, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2893,
49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976).
FN19. Article I contains two Ex Post Facto Clauses, one directed to Congress (§ 9,
cl. 3), the other to the States (§ 10, cl. 1). We have construed the Clauses as
applicable only to penal legislation. See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 390-391, 1
L.Ed. 648 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.).
These provisions demonstrate that retroactive statutes raise particular concerns. The
Legislature's unmatched powers allow it to sweep away settled expectations suddenly
and without individualized consideration. Its responsivity to political pressures poses a
risk that it may be tempted to use retroactive legislation as a means of retribution
against unpopular groups or individuals. As Justice Marshall observed in his opinion for
' 4'1498 the Court in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17
5
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(1981), the Et Post Facto Clause not only ensures that individuals have "fair warning"
about the effect of criminal statutes, but also "restricts governmental power by
restraining arbitrary and potentially vindictive legislation." Id., at 28-29, 101 S.Ct., at
%3-964 (citations omitted). F142°
FN20. See Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 513-514, 109 S.Ct. 706,
732, 102 L.Ed.2d 854 (1989) ("Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that
promulgate rules to govern future conduct. The constitutional prohibitions against
the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern
about the use of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of
private citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, that is
best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies that will create
the conditions that presumably would have existed had no wrong been committed")
(STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213, 247, n. 3, 81 S.Ct. 1052, 1052, n. 3, 6 L.Ed.2d 246 (1961)
(retroactive punitive measures may reflect "a purpose not to prevent dangerous
conduct generally but to impose by legislation a penalty against specific persons or
classes of persons").
These well entrenched constitutional protections and presumptions against
retroactive application of legislation establish that 18 U.S.C. §2255 (2005) in effect at the
time of the alleged conduct applies to the instant action, and not the amended version.
Not only is there no clear express intent stating that the statute is to apply
retroactively, but applying the current version of the statute, as amended in 2006, would
be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution as it
would be applied to events occurring before its enactment and would increase the penalty
or punishment for the alleged crime. U.S. Const. Art. 1, §9, cl. 3, §10, cl. 1. U.S. v.
Seigel 153 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 1998); U.S. v. 162 F.3d 87 (3d Cir. 1998); and
generally, Calder v. Bull 3 U.S. 386, 390,1 L.Ed. 648, 1798 WL 587 (Calder) (1798).
The United States Constitution provides that "[n]o Bill of Attainder or ex
post facto Law shall be passed" by Congress. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A law
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause if it " sappli[es] to events occurring before its
enactment ... [and] disadvantage[s] the offender affected by it' by altering the
definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime."
Lvnce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433, 117 S.Ct. 891, 137 L.Ed.2d 63 (1997) (quoting
Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 29, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)).
U.S. v. Siegel 153 F.3d 1256, 1259 (11th Cir. 1998).
6
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The statute, as amended in 2006, contains no language stating that the application
is to be retroactive. Thus, there is no manifest intent that the statute is to apply
retroactively, and, accordingly, the statute in effect during the time of the alleged conduct
is to apply. Landgraf v. USI Film Products, supra, at 1493, ("A statement that a statute
will become effective on a certain date does not even arguably suggest that it has any
application to conduct that occurred at an earlier date.").
This statute was enacted as part of the Federal Criminal Statutes targeting sexual
predators and sex crimes against children. H.R. 3494, "Child Protection and Sexual
Predator Punishment Act of 1998;" House Report No. 105-557, 11, 1998 U.S.C.A.N.
678, 679 (1998). Quoting from the "Background and Need For Legislation" portion of
the House Report No. 105-557, 11-16, H.R. 3494, of which 18 U.S.C. §2255 is included,
is described as "the most comprehensive package of new crimes and increased penalties
ever developed in response to crimes against children, particularly assaults facilitated by
computers." Further showing that §2255 was enacted as a criminal penalty or
punishment, "Title II — Punishing Sexual Predators," Sec. 206, from House Report No.
105-557, 5-6, specifically includes reference to the remedy created under §2255 as an
additional means of punishing sexual predators, along with other penalties and
punishments. Senatorial Comments in amending §2255 in 2006 confirm that the creation
of the presumptive minimum damage amount is meant as an additional penalty against
those who sexually exploit or abuse children. 2006 WL 2034118, 152 Cong. Rec. S8012-
02. Senator Kerry refers to the statutorily imposed damage amount as "penalties." Id.
The cases of U.S. v. Siegel, supra (11th Cir. 1998), and U.S. v supra (3d
Cir. 1998), also support Defendant's position that application of the current version of 18
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U.S.C. §2255 would be in clear violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. In Siegel, the
Eleventh Circuit found that the Ex Post Facto Clause bared application of the Mandatory
Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA) to the defendant whose criminal conduct
occurred before the effective date of the statute, 18 U.S.C. §3664(1)(1)(A), even though
the guilty plea and sentencing proceeding occurred after the effective date of the statute.
On July 19, 1996, the defendant Siegel pleaded guilty to various charges under 18 U.S.C.
§371 and §1956(a)(1)(A), (conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud, bank fraud, and
laundering of money instruments; and money laundering). He was sentenced on March
7, 1997. As part of his sentence, Siegel was ordered to pay $1,207,000.00 in restitution
under the MVRA which became effective on April 24, 1996. Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214, 1229-1236. The 1996 amendments to MVRA required that the district court
must order restitution in the full amount of the victim's loss without consideration of the
defendant's ability to pay. Prior to the enactment of the MVRA and under the former 18
U.S.C. §3664(a) of the Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (VWPA), Pub.I. No.
97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, the court was required to consider, among other factors, the
defendant's ability to pay in determining the amount of restitution.
When the MVRA was enacted in 1996, Congress stated that the amendments to the
VWPA "shall, to the extent constitutionally permissible, be effective for sentencing
proceedings in cases in which the defendant is convicted on or after the date of enactment
of this Act [Apr. 24, 19961." Siegel, supra at 1258. The alleged crimes occurred between
February, 1988 to May, 1990. The Court agreed with the defendant's position that 1996
MVRA "should not be applied in reviewing the validity of the court's restitution order
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because to do so would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution. See U.S. Const. art I, §9, cl. 3."
The Ex Post Facto analysis made by the Eleventh Circuit in Siegel is applicable to
this action. In resolving the issue in favor of the defendant, the Court first considered
whether a restitution order is a punishment. Id, at 1259. In determining that restitution
was a punishment, the Court noted that §3663A(a)(1) of Title 18 expressly describes
restitution as a "penalty." In addition, the Court also noted that "[a]lthough not in the
context of an ex post facto determination, ... restitution is a 'criminal penalty meant to
have strong deterrent and rehabilitative effect.' United States v. Twitty 107 F.3d 1482,
1493 n. 12 (11th Cir.1997)." Second, the Court considered "whether the imposition of
restitution under the MVRA is an increased penalty as prohibited by the Ex Post Facto
Clause." Id, at 1259. In determining that the application of the 1996 MVRA would
indeed run afoul of the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause, the Court agreed with the
majority of the Circuits that restitution under the 1996 MVRA was an increased penalty.4
"The effect of the MVRA can be detrimental to a defendant. Previously, after considering
the defendant's financial condition, the court had the discretion to order restitution in an
amount less than the loss sustained by the victim. Under the MVRA, however, the court
must order restitution to each victim in the full amount." Id, at 1260. See also U.S. v.
a 162 F.2d 87 (3rd Circuit 1998).
4 The Eleventh Circuit, in holding that "the MVRA cannot be applied to a person whose
criminal conduct occurred prior to April 24, 1996," was "persuaded by the majority of
districts on this issue." "Restitution is a criminal penalty carrying with it characteristics
of criminal punishment." Siegel, supra at 1260. The Eleventh Circuit is in agreement
with the Second, Third, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits. See U.S. v. Futrell 209 F.3d
1286, 1289-90 (11 th Cir. 2000).
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As discussed above, 18 U.S.C. §2255 was enacted as part of the criminal statutory
scheme to punish and penalize those who sexually exploit and abuse minors, and thus, the
Ex Post Fact Clause prohibits a retroactive application of the 2006 amended version.
Notwithstanding the above legal analysis, in the recent case of Individual Known
to Defendant As 08MIST096•JPG and 08mist067.ipg v. Falso, 2009 WL 4807537 (N.D.
N.Y. Dec. 9, 2009), United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
addressed the issue of whether §2255 is a civil or criminal statute for purposes of the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. The New York Court stated that
"looking to the plain language of §2255(a), it is clear that the statutory intent was to
provide a civil remedy. This is exemplified by the title ... and the fact that the statute
aims to provide compensation to individuals who suffered personal injury as a result of
criminal conduct against them." The New York Court in analyzing whether §2255
violated the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, concluded that although
the behavior to which §2255 is criminal, it did not find that the "primary aim" was
"retribution and deterrence." "The statute serves civil goals." The "primary aim" is "the
compensation for personal injuries sustained as a result of criminal conduct."
Therefore, because Jane Doe 103 has invoked the provisions of the criminal Non-
Prosecution Agreement (NPA) between EPSTEIN and USAO (see paragraphs 25 and 26
of complaint), plaintiff cannot avoid the full protection of the rule of lenity and due
process to which EPSTEIN is entitled in the context of these unique factual
circumstances.
Although there does not exist any definitive ruling of whether the damages
awarded under §2255 are meant as criminal punishment or a civil damages award,
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Defendant is still entitled to a determination as a matter of law that the statute in effect at
the time of the alleged criminal conduct applies.
As explained by the Landgraf court, supra at 280, and at 1505,5
When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after the events in suit, the court's
first task is to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the statute's proper
reach. If Congress has done so, of course, there is no need to resort to judicial default
rules. When, however, the statute contains no such express command, the court must
determine whether the new statute would have retroactive effect, Le., whether it would
impair rights a party possessed when he acted, increase a party's liability for past
conduct, or impose new duties with respect to transactions already completed. If the
statute would operate retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that it does not
govern absent clear congressional intent favoring such a result.
Here, there is no clear expression of intent regarding the 2006 Act's application to
conduct occurring well before its enactment. See discussion of House Bill Reports and
Congressional background above herein.
As stated in Landgraf, "the extent of a party's liability, in the civil context as well as
the criminal, is an important legal consequence that cannot be ignored." Courts have
consistently refused to apply a statute which substantially increases a party's liability to
conduct occurring before the statute's enactment. Landgraf, supra at 284-85. Even if
plaintiff were to argue that retroactive application of the new statute "would vindicate its
purpose more fully," even that consideration is not enough to rebut the presumption
against retroactivity. Id, at 285-86. "The presumption against statutory retroactivity is
founded upon sound considerations of general policy and practice, and accords with long
held and widely shared expectations about the usual operation of legislation." Id.
Thus, Count Six should be dismissed.
5 In Landgraf, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals
and refused to apply new provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to conduct occurring before
the effective date of the Act. The Court determined that statutory text in question, *102, was
subject to the presumption against statutory retroactivity.
11
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Motion For More Definite Statement and To Strike, Rule 12(e) and (U. F.R.C.P.
As noted above, Plaintiff alleges that she was 17 year old high school student as
of January, 2004, and that the alleged conduct involving EPSTEIN occurred "between
approximately January 2004 and May 2005. Thus, Plaintiff had to be 18 (no longer a
minor) by January of 2005. Under the principles of statutory construction, the language
of §2255(a) is clear — "Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section ...of this title
and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in any appropriate
United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such minor sustains
and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in
the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than
$50,000 in value."
As Plaintiff's date of birth is significant to her §2255 claim, she should be
required to more definitely state her date of birth so that Defendant and this Court are
able to determine precisely when she reached the age of majority. (The age of majority
under both federal and state law is 18 years old. See 18 U.S.C. §2256(1), defining a
"minor" as "any person under the age of eighteen years;" and §1.01, Definitions, Fla.
Stat., defining "minor" to include "any person who has not attained the age of 18 years.")
To the extent that Plaintiff is relying on any alleged conduct that occurred after
her 18 birthday as an element of her §2255 claim, such allegations should be stricken as
immaterial and she should be required to more definitely state the dates of the alleged
conduct. See Rule 12(1). Defendant also seeks to strike ¶¶10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16,
of Plaintiff's Complaint as immaterial and impertinent. None of the allegations in those
paragraphs specifically pertain to the Plaintiff. Not until ¶17 does Plaintiff assert
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allegations pertaining to her and the conduct of Defendant directly involving her. What
EPSTEIN may or may not have allegedly done with respect to other alleged girls does
not effect Plaintiff's claim brought pursuant to §2255. The allegations in ¶¶10-16 are not
related to the elements of Plaintiffs §2255 claim and, thus, are required to be stricken.
Conclusion
Pursuant to the above, Count Six is required to be dismissed. In addition, Plaintiff
should be required to more definitely state her date of birth, and any conduct occurring
after her 18th birthday should be stricken, and ¶¶l0 — 16 of the Complaint should also be
stricken.
WHEREFORE, Defendant requests that this Court dismiss Count Six against him,
and further grant his Motion for More Definite Statement and to Strike.
/s/ Robert D. Critton
Robert D. Critton, Esq.
Attorney for Defendant
Certificate of Service
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true copy of the foregoing was electronically filed
with the Clerk of the Court using CM/ECF. I also certify that the foregoing document is
being served this day on all counsel of record identified on the following Service List in
the manner specified by CM/ECF on this 12'h day of April, 2010.
Robert C. Josefsberg, Esq.
Katherine W. Ezell, Esq.
Podhurst Orseck, P.A.
25 West Flagler Street, Suite 800
Miami, FL 33130
[Phone Redacted]
Fax: [Phone Redacted]
[Email Redacted]
[Email Redacted]
Counsel for Plaintiff
Jack Alan Goldberger, Esq.
Atterbury Goldberger & Weiss, P.A.
250 Australian Avenue South
Suite 1400
West Palm Beach, FL 33401-5012
[Phone Redacted]
Fax: [Phone Redacted]
jagesq®bellsouth.net
Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein
Respectfully submitted,
13
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By: /s/ Robert D. Critton
ROBERT D. CRITTON, JR., ESQ.
Florida Bar No. 224162
[Email Redacted]
MICHAEL J. PIKE, ESQ.
Florida Bar #617296
moikeabcIclaw.com
BURMAN, CRITTON, LUTHER &
COLEMAN
303 Banyan Blvd., Suite 400
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
561/842-2820 Phone
561/515-3148 Fax
(Counsel for Defendant Jeffrey Epstein)
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18 USCA 42255 (1999-July 26, 2006):
PART I--CRIMES
CHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF
CHILDREN
§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries
(a) Any minor who is a victim of a violation of section 2241(c), 2242,
2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421, 2422, or Zal of this title
and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation may sue in
any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual
damages such minor sustains and the cost of the suit, including a
reasonable attorney's fee. Any minor as described in the preceding
sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than
$50,000 in value.
(b) Any action commenced under this section shall be barred unless the
complaint is filed within six years after the right of action first accrues or
in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later than three years
after the disability.
CREDIT(S)
(Added Pub.L. 99-500. Title I. 8 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 18,
1986, 100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591. Title I. § 101(b)
[Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314,
Title VI. 6 605, Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984.)
18 U.S.C. 42255, as amended 2006, Effective July 27, 2006:
PART I--CRIMES
CHAPTER 110-SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSE OF
CHILDREN
§ 2255. Civil remedy for personal injuries
(a) In general.--Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation
of section 2241(c) 2242. 2243, 2251, 2251A, 2252, 2252A, 2260, 2421,
2422, or 2423 of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such
violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was a
minor, may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall
recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit,
including a reasonable attorney's fee. Any person as described in the
preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less
than $150,000 in value.
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Case 9:10-cv-80309-KAM Document 15-1 Entered on FLSD Docket 04/12/2010 Page 16 of 16
(b) Statute of limitations. --Any action commenced under this section shall
be barred unless the complaint is filed within six years after the right of
action first accrues or in the case of a person under a legal disability, not later
than three years after the disability.
CREDIT(S)
(Added Pub.L. 99-500, Title I, 101(b) [Title VII, § 703(a)], Oct. 18, 1986,
100 Stat. 1783-75, and amended Pub.L. 99-591. Title I. 101(b) [Title VII, §
703(a)], Oct. 30, 1986, 100 Stat. 3341-75; Pub.L. 105-314. Title VI, § 605,
Oct. 30, 1998, 112 Stat. 2984; Pub.L. 109-248, Title VII, 707(b). (c), July
27, 2006, 120 Stat. 650.)
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