Court Records
Filing # 153914273 E-Filed 07/22/2022 05:34:26 PM
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND
FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CA FLORIDA HOLDINGS, LLC,
Publisher of THE PALM BEACH POST,
Plaintiff,
v.
DAVE ARONBERG, as State Attorney of
Palm Beach County, Florida; SHARON R.
BOCK, as Clerk and Comptroller of Palm
Beach County, Florida,
Defendants.
CASE NO.: 50-2019-CA-014681-AG
AGREED MOTION OF PLAINTIFF C
PUBLISHER OF THE PALM BEACH
JUDGE DONALD J. HAFELE TO R
PENDING STATE ATTORNEY'S
HIS ASSIGNMENT T E
O
HOLDINGS, LLC
THE HON. CIRCUIT
JURISDICTION OVER THE
NS MOTION [DE S0I AFTER
VENILE DIVISION
Plaintiff, CA FLORIDA HOLDI the Publisher of The Palm Beach Post ("The Palm
Beach Post"), moves for an o ting that Hon. Circuit Judge Donald J. Hafele retain
jurisdiction over the State Atto 's Amended Motion for Sanctions under Florida Statutes
§ 57.105 [DE 50] a r his ssignment to the Juvenile Division, and in support states:
I. s c has a long history. As this Court is well aware, The Palm Beach Post
brought t t seeking public disclosure of the State of Florida grand jury materials relating
to the trim I prosecution of Jeffrey Epstein against both the Palm Beach County State Attorney's
Office and the Clerk and Comptroller. The sole issue remaining before the Court is the State
Attorney's November 9, 2020 Amended Motion for Sanctions under Florida Statutes § 57.105 [DE
50].
*** FILED: PALM BEACH COUNTY, FL ABRUZZO, CLERK. 07/22/2022 05:34:26 PM ***
EFTA02734617
2. Initially both defendants, the Office of the State Attorney for Palm Beach County,
Florida, and the Clerk and Comptroller of Palm Beach County, Florida, opposed public disclosure
of the Epstein grand jury materials.
3. After the Office of the State Attorney ended its opposition to disclosure of the
Epstein grand jury materials and adopted a neutral position, The Palm Beach Post cjropped the
Office of the State Attorney from the case.
4. Nevertheless, the Office of the State Attorney moved for against The
Palm Beach Post pursuant to Florida Statutes § 57.105, and filed its tion for Sanctions
on November 9, 2020 [DE 50].
5. The Palm Beach Post opposes the Office o c Attorney's Amended Motion
'Sfor Sanctions, the motion has been fully briefed S,,
evidentiary hearing on the Court's non-jury k forr September 6, 2022 as the #4 back-up
case. The Amended Motion had been two or dockets but was not reached.
6. During the penden o dice of the State Attorney's sanctions motion, The
Palm Beach Post moved for su a j dgment before the Hon. Donald J. Hafele.
7. On Octo 21, this Court heard arguments for over 2 hours from counsel for
The Palm Beach t and e Clerk and Comptroller as to the merits of The Palm Beach Post's
motion for s judgment. At the end of that hearing, the Court complimented counsel as to
their and professionalism and acknowledged that the issues were complex and novel
and required significant research and analysis.
8. On December 20, 2021, this Court issued a lengthy Opinion and Final Judgment
that denied The Palm Beach Post's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. A
copy of the Final Judgment is attached as Exhibit A.
2
atter has been set for a two-hour
EFTA02734618
9. The Palm Beach Post filed a notice of appeal that remains pending.
10. In light of this Court's intimate knowledge and experience with this case, as well
as the Office of the State Attorney's pending motion for sanctions, which addresses the complex
and novel constitutional, statutory and common law issues that have been analyzed in this Court's
Final Judgment, this Court's retention of jurisdiction solely to adjudicate the Office 9f the State
Attorney's motion for sanctions is warranted.
II. This Court's familiarity with the case and its intricacies will i ial resources
and will be far more efficient for the court system and the parties w judge who is
unfamiliar with the case get up to speed.
12. The sanctions motion [DE 50] is the only pfetention by this Court, as the
Final Judgment is on appeal, and there are no othera ding before the Circuit Court.
Ni 13. Retention for the sanctions mo c• Nitiary hearing, which is set for two hours, fr j
should not create an undue burden fort • ourt uvenile Division docket.
WHEREFORE, The Palm Bea t ectfully requests that this agreed motion be granted,
that this Court retain jurisdicti ov the Office of the State Attorney's Amended Motion for
Sanctions under Florida § 57.105 [DE 50], and schedule a two-hour evidentiary hearing
at the Court's co ence, and grant such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.
CERTIFICATE OF CONFERRAL
2022, Lauren Whetstone, counsel for Plaintiff, CA Florida Holdings, LLC, the
Publisher of The Palm Beach Post, conferred with Doug Wyler, counsel for Defendant, Dave
Aronberg, as State Attorney of Palm Beach County, to seek his consent with regard to the relief
sought in this Motion. Mr. Wyler, counsel for Dave Aronberg, agrees to the relief sought herein.
3
EFTA02734619
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Mark Bideau
LAUREN WHETSTONE
Florida Bar No. 45192
MARK F. BIDEAU
Florida Bar No. 564044
GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.
777 South Flagler Drive, Suite 300 East
West Palm Beach, FL 33401
Tel.: [Phone Redacted]
[Email Redacted]
bideaum tlaw.co
sandra.famadas
STEP ENDELSOHN
Flo . 849324
TRAURIG, P.A.
0 atlas
Olas Boulevard, Suite 2000
„ rt auderdale, FL 33301 S\ rn
.: [Phone Redacted]
endelsohnsAgtlaw.com
smithlegtlaw.com * if
4
MICHAEL J. GRYGIEL
(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.
54 State Street, 6th Floor
Albany, NY 12207
Tel.: [Phone Redacted]
grvaielmeiztlaw.com
NINA D. BOYAJIAN
(Admitted Pro Hac Vice)
GREENBERG TRAURIG, P.A.
1840 Century Park East, Suite 1900
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Tel.: [Phone Redacted]
bovaiianna,etlaw.com
[Email Redacted]
Counsel for Plaintiff CA Florida Holdings,
LW, Publisher of The Palm Beach Post
EFTA02734620
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing has been
electronically filed with the Florida E-File Portal for e-service on all parties of record herein on
July 22, 2022.
/s/ Mark Bideau
CoSA
Mark Bideau
5
EFTA02734621
cos
+6s
EFTA02734622
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTEENTH
JUDICIAL CIRCUIT IN AND FOR PALM BEACH COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIRCUIT CIVIL DIVISION: AG
CASE NO.: 50-2019-CA-014681 -XXXX-MB
CA FLORIDA HOLDINGS LLC PUBLISHER
OF THE PALM BEACH POST,
Plaintiff/Petitioner
vs.
DAVE ARONBERG,
SHARON R BOCK,
Defendant/Respondents.
FINAL JUDGMENT
THIS CAUSE came before the court on the mono
Florida Holdings, LLC, publisher of The Palm
complaint in this action. (D.E. # 58.) Th e ralhaining defendant, Abruzzo, in his
capacity as the Clerk and Comptrolle each County ("the clerk"), filed a response to the
motion on October I, 2021. (D. e Newspaper filed a reply on October 13, 2021. (D.E.
# 77.) The motion was heard b e court on October 22, 2021. The court has considered the
submissions of the arue th arguments of counsel, the record in the case, and is otherwise c r
advised of the i Because Count II of the Newspaper's complaint, which is the only other
count, h I" • sed of by Order filed June 7, 2020 (D.E. # 33), this is a final judgment in the
Cos
mmary judgment of plaintiff CA
case.'
os ("the Newspaper"), on Count I of its
' The court is aware that in an October 22, 2021, article published by the Newspaper it suggested
that the court indicated at the hearing that it was inclined to release the records. The Newspaper
may have misheard the court's remarks during the hearing, which lasted nearly two hours. The
court is not criticizing the Newspaper and has a great deal of respect for the reporter but must
clarify that the court stated that it had not made a decision whether it would order that the grand
jury records would be produced. (Hrg. Tr. at 19:11-16.) The court reiterated, "So, I just wanted
1
EFTA02734623
SUMMARY OF THE CASE AND ITS CURRENT STATUS
The Newspaper filed its complaint on November 14, 2019, seeking disclosure and
production of documents, exhibits, testimony transcripts, audio and visual materials, and all other
things ("the Materials") presented to the 2006 grand jury in proceedings instituted by the State
Attorney for the I5`" Judicial Circuit in and for Palm Beach County, Florida ("the State Attorney")
which resulted in an indictment of Jeffrey Epstein for one count of Felon itation of
Prostitution, No. 50-2006-CF-009454-AXXX-MB, and a subsequent char wring Person g4 5I
Under Age 18 for Prostitution, 50-2008-CF-009381-AXXX-MB. In c : on June 30, 2008,
Mr. Epstein pleaded guilty to the charge of Procuring Person 8 for Prostitution. He
was sentenced to 12 months of community control in t uts of the Palm Beach County
Sheriff's Office. (2008-CF-009381, D.E. # 11, 12; 9454, D.E. # 89.)
i i‘ Count I of the Newspaper's comp n a declaratory judgment that section c oed
905.27(1)(c), Florida Statutes, should b - erp to permit disclosure of the Materials to the
Newspaper so that it may then re r content as part of its continued investigation and
reporting of matters relating to n. That count also seeks a declaration ordering disclosure
reof the Materials "pursuan court's] inherent authority over grand jury proceedings because
of the exception ublic nterest in this case and the compelling circumstances supporting
transparency ended Complaint, 1 71.)
PRELIMINARY PROCEDURAL ISSUE
The court notes that the only other defendant in this case, the State Attorney, has been
dismissed, and there have been no attempts to intervene in this case to take a position against
to make that clear from the outset, that there will be no wholesale turning over of any records if —
and, again, that is a significant word — if the production is ordered." (Hrg. Tr. at 20:9-13,
emphasis added.)
2
EFTA02734624
disclosure. The clerk's position is that he is merely the custodian of the Materials, and as such he
has no real interest in the issues before the court as identified. The clerk only needs direction from
the court on whether or not he should produce and disclose the Materials. Nonetheless, the clerk
has zealously advocated the position against disclosure based upon grand jury secrecy and
confidentiality because under Rule 2.420(d)(1XB)(xvi) of the Florida Rules of General Practice
and Judicial Administration, the clerk is required to maintain the confidentialit4iand jury
records.
The clerk is correct that his role as custodian of the Materials '
direction once confidentiality is determined. The clerk'
complicated, or expanded, because the Newspaper
and
filed • ti a civil declaratory judgment
clerk's :11 proceeding has been
action has moved for summary judgment u Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510.
tt
However, the proper procedure for obtaining • i f confidential court records is set forth in
ci
iss„
Florida Rule of General Practice and J ial inistration 2.420(j), which only requires the
filing of a "motion" seeking disclo . Gen. Prac. & Jud. Admin Rule 2.420(jX2).
Accordingly, the court ill t the Newspaper's complaint and motion for summary
judgment as a motion for
0 ollow the court's
under Rule 2.420(j).2 As a result, the court need not determine,
as a matter of la hethef the clerk of the court is a proper party defendant to a declaratory
judgment ac the release of grand jury records. Although the clerk of court is the proper
2 Rule 2.420(j)(3) requires a party seeking disclosure to serve the motion "on all parties and
reasonably affected non-parties[.j" Of course, that did not occur here and would have been
impossible to carry out, as "reasonably affected non-parties" cannot be determined without
actually seeing the Materials. Because the court is denying the relief sought, however, this issue
is academic.
3
EFTA02734625
subject of any order directing the release of protected grand jury records issued pursuant to Rule
2.420(j), under the rule it is not a "defendant" or "party" in relation to the requested itself.
The court's determination to treat the Newspaper's claim as a Rule 2.420(j) motion
resolves another issue as well. The Newspaper devotes significant argument to its standing to
prosecute this action, arguing that section 905.27 vests it with a private right of action. (Motion,
11 81-90.). First, the argument of whether section 905.27 creates a private ri ction was
already substantively addressed by this court's Order dismissing Cou e Amended
Complaint. (D.E. # 33). Second, the court sees no reason to question e per's standing to
bring a Rule 2.420(j) motion, which is available to any mem th blic seeking access to
records of the judicial branch. See Fla. R. Gen. Prac. & J . 2.420(a).
Lastly, even in treating the complaint and m ary judgment as a motion under
Rule 2.420(j), there are no disputed fact issuer ssues before the court are issues of law.
Accordingly, this is a final judgment.
SPUTED FACT
The facts germane tot fin I judgment are not in dispute and are recounted here. The
2006 grand jury was con n proceedings instituted by the State Attorney regarding alleged
criminal miscon of a sexual nature by Jeffrey Epstein, now deceased. Materials were
presented to d jury. The United States Department of Justice, by and through the office of
the Ur1I tes Attorney for the Southern District of Florida, obtained the Materials.3 The
3 This fact is established by Exhibit 3 to the Newspaper's motion, which is the United States
Department of Justice, Office of Professional Responsibility Report, "Investigation into the U.S.
Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Florida's Resolution of Its 2006-2008 Federal
Criminal Investigation of Jeffrey Epstein and Its Interactions with Victims during the
Investigation," Nov. 2020 ("the Report"). The Report makes references to the fact that the federal
government obtained and reviewed the Materials. See the Report at 20, n. 23, 26, 38 n. 67, 271 n.
425 and 283.
4
EFTA02734626
Newspaper operates and does business in Palm Beach County, Florida. The clerk is a duly elected
governmental official, and he and his office have custody of the Materials.
ANALYSIS
The Newspaper appears to have presented questions of first impression regarding both the
interpretation of section 905.27 and the "inherent authority" of the court. Those questions also
implicate issues of constitutional import regarding the historic tension between secrecy
and the First Amendment. Additionally, the Newspaper presents these que he context of
genuine subjects of public interest and concern regarding the prosecu ss of Mr. Epstein.
Mr. Epstein was a person of great wealth and influence acc of g a sex predator who Ac5tengaged in criminal sex trafficking of minors, among oth c 'm
SThe public record establishes° that Mr. E i t into a federal non-prosecution
agreement with the United States Attorney foye l o ern District of Florida in exchange for a
guilty plea in the then pending state cou e t ne count of procuring a minor for prostitution,
for which he served less than a ye lease incarceration at the Palm Beach County Jail?
Mr. Epstein was federally indi in 19 by the United States Attorney for the Southern District
of New York for the s of conduct during the 2002-2005 time-span preceding the 2006
state indictment the 2 8 no-prosecution agreement negotiated with the federal prosecutor.
Mr. Epstein ver brought to trial on those 2019 charges, having committed suicide in his
New Y 1.
° See the Report, referenced inn. 1, supra.
51d
5
EFTA02734627
In this Order, the court rules against the Newspaper because the established and binding
maxims of Florida law constrain it to do so. As noted below, federal courts have departed from
the limited prescriptions of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) in granting access to grand
jury records in "special circumstances." E.g., In re Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99, 102 (2d Cir.
1997) (recognizing "that there are certain "special circumstances" in which release of grand jury
records is appropriate even outside of the boundaries of [Rule 6(e)]"). Florida la ever, has
yet to recognize such flexibility under either section 905.27 or Rule 2.420 • q.)
(A) Section 905.27 and the phrase "furthering j e.
The court first addresses the issue whether the Newspa ' cla its within "the purpose c
ThAct iof . . . furthering justice" under section 905.27(1)(c). 1 of sections 905.27(1) and (2)
provide context:
(1) A grand juror, state attorney, assi to attorney, reporter, stenographer,
interpreter, or any other person ap be re the grand jury shall not disclose
the testimony of a witness exa • ed b ore the grand jury or other evidence
received by it except when repo a court to disclose the testimony for the
purpose of:
(a) Ascertaining wheth it is consistent with the testimony given by the witness
before the court;
(b) Determ th r the witness is guilty of perjury; or
(c) Fu ustice.
(2)"S(7►Itdlawful for any person knowingly to publish, broadcast, disclose,
or communicate to any other person, or knowingly to cause or permit to
be lished, broadcast, disclosed, divulged, or communicated to any other person,
in any manner whatsoever, any testimony of a witness examined before the
grand jury, or the content, gist, or import thereof, except when such testimony
is or has been disclosed in a court proceeding. When a court orders the
disclosure of such testimony pursuant to subsection (1) for use in a criminal
case, it may be disclosed to the prosecuting attorney of the court in which such
criminal case is pending, and by the prosecuting attorney to his or her assistants,
legal associates, and employees, and to the defendant and the defendant's attorney,
and by the latter to his or her legal associates and employees. When such
6
EFTA02734628
disclosure is ordered by a court pursuant to subsection (1) for use in a civil
case, it may be disclosed to all parties to the case and to their attorneys and by the
latter to their legal associates and employees. However, the grand jury testimony
afforded such persons by the court can only be used in the defense or
prosecution of the civil or criminal case and for no other purpose whatsoever.
(Emphasis added.)
Reading subsection 1(c) ("furthering justice") in tandem with subsection (2), it is evident
that the phrase "furthering justice" is to be interpreted in the context of seeking disc of grand
jury materials for use in a pending criminal or civil case. The Newspaper edges that it is C
not seeking disclosure of the Materials for such a purpose. (Amend
114.) Instead, the Newspaper advocates a more expansive int tan of the term "furthering Aca
or civil case, it seeks an additional declaration tha e ed use of the Materials "is not so
it h)justice" and also posits that because it is not seeking disclo o aterials for use in a criminal
\
limited" by section 905.27(2). (Id.) The New ts the ability to publish the Materials and
i
reference them in its reporting and also t ke t Materials available "to the public." (Amended
s tir
Complaint, prayer at 21; Motion,
The Newspaper makes tron guments to advance its more expansive construction of
section 905.27 as part of ' *ng justice." Unquestionably, the established matters surrounding
Mr. Epstein's co t, the ircumstances of his resolution of the 2006 state charges and potential
federal char his 2008 guilty plea and incarceration are matters of public interest, and
disclo e Materials may arguably fall within the concept of "furthering justice" in the
broadest, social sense of the phrase. Yet, the court's interpretation of the scope of section 905.27
t, ¶ 70; Motion ¶
6 The Newspaper concedes in its submissions that the court could first conduct an in camera review
of the Materials and redact any information the court deems sensitive, such as identities of
"innocent parties." (Amended Complaint, ¶ 9; Motion, ¶y 80 n.3, 110 n. 7.)
7
EFTA02734629
and of the phrase "furthering justice" is governed and constrained by the established rules of
statutory construction.
In interpreting a statute, the court must respect the role of the legislature, the legislative
process, and the language of the statute. "'A court's function is to interpret statutes as they are
written and give effect to each word in the statute." State v. Sampaio, 291 So. 3d 120, 125 (Fla.
4'h DCA 2020) (quoting Ha. Dept. of Revenue v. Fla. Mun. Power Agency, 789
(Fla. 2001). "[W]hen legislation is clear 'our task is to apply the text,
Kaplan v. Epstein, 219 So. 3d 932, 933 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (quoting
Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989). "It is our [c
320, 324
ove upon it."
eFlore v. Marvel
to interpret the law as
tgiven us by the people in the Constitution or by the Legis re not permitted to substitute
\judicial cerebration for law or that which we thin e w ould be and command that it be
l
.
i n
enforced." hr re Investigation of Circuit ,htd
11.4c
th Judicial Circuit of Florida, 93 So. 2d
601, 608 (Fla. 1957). "As courts, we sh nev orget that in construing acts of the legislature,
we are concerned only with the po r legislature to enact the law. Our peculiar social and
economic views have no plac a consideration." Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833, 838
(Fla. 1963).
Turning t lion 5.27, the term "furthering justice" as used in subsection (l)(c) cannot
be read in a v without regard to the entire text of the statute, and particularly subsection (2).
"Eve must [also] be read as a whole with meaning ascribed to every portion and due
regard given to the semantic and contextual interrelationship between its parts." Indian River
County v. Ocean Concrete, Inc., 308 So. 3d 1010, 1014 (Fla. 4th DCA 2020) (quoting Ha. Dept!
of Emit Prot. v. ContraciPoint LL(', 986 So. 2d 1260, 1265 (Fla. 2008) (quoting
Forsythe v. Longboat Key Reach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1992)).
8
EFTA02734630
Subsection (2) clearly limits section 925.27's scope to those instances in which grand jury
testimony or materials need to be disclosed for use in a criminal or civil case. Subsection (2)
provides that once grand jury testimony is disclosed in the course of a court proceeding, it is then
open to unlimited dissemination. But before that occurs, the court must determine that one of the
three needs prescribed in subsection (1) is present in a criminal or civil case that requires
disclosure. There is nothing in section 905.27 that gives a court cane blanche aut to release
grand jury materials in any situation that might bear some relationship to "fpMl g justtiice" in its
broadest sense.
Accordingly, the Newspaper's argument that section 2 the term "furthering
t ;)justice" permits disclosure of grand jury materials in the si .0 st be denied here, where there
\is no criminal or civil case in which it is to be used.S r
(B) The court's "inherent „ S ."
Alternatively, the Newspaper ar tha e court has "inherent authority" to order the
release of the Materials. At severe its submissions, the Newspaper asserts its "right" or
"entitlement" to disclosure of rials under both section 905.27 and the court's "inherent
authority and supervisors." (Amended Complaint ¶ 70, Motion, ¶¶ 86, 113, 114) There
is, however, no
proposition
to gra
Amendment right to the disclosure of grand jury materials. "A settled
the press does not contest, is this: there is no First Amendment right of access
eedings." In re Motions of Dow & Co., 142 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir.
1998), cert. denied sub nom. Dow & Co., Inc. v. Clinton, 525 U.S. 820 (1998); accord, In
re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 522, 523 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
The Newspaper provides several passages from state and federal cases generally
recognizing a court's "inherent authority." (Motion, ¶ 95.) The Newspaper also cites several
9
EFTA02734631
federal cases in which grand jury materials were disclosed, yet those cases substantially turn on
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which governs disclosure of grand jury materials and
contains provisions not present in Florida statutes and rules. (Motion,1 96.) The Newspaper also
references the recent example of a Kentucky state court releasing portions of grand jury testimony
in the Breonna Taylor case under Kentucky Rule of Criminal Procedure 5.24, which gives
Kentucky courts broad, unrestricted authority to "at any time . . . direct otherwlt regarding
disclosure of grand jury materials. (Motion, ¶¶ 97-100.) Finally, the r cites In re
Petition of Craig, 131 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 1997), in which the court there o umber of factors
to consider in determining whether, under federal law and rule er ourt may release grand
jury
AO
F for reasons other than those enumerated in F e of Criminal Procedure 6(e).
The Newspaper argues that this court should ap t S actors in exercising its "inherent
( \Kauthority" to release the Materials.
A court's "inherent authority" h • s bo S daries. "[1]f a specific statute or rule applies,
the trial court should rely on the rule or statute rather than on inherent authority."
Moakley v. Smallwood, 826 So d 2 1, 227 (Fla. 2002) (addressing inherent authority to sanction
attorney misconduct); accl ntini v. Cleveland Clinic Florida, 65 So. 3d 22, 38 (Fla. 4th DCA
2011) (fmding th erred in relying on inherent authority instead of sanctions statute).
"In a contes a clear, valid, unchallenged statute and a trial court's general "inherent
author atute must prevail." Swearingen v. Pretzer, 310 So. 3d 1084, 1089 (Fla. 1st DCA
2020) (Kelsey, J. dissenting).
The Newspaper has provided no Florida authority holding that a trial court may use its
"inherent authority" to order disclosure of grand jury materials in the face of section 905.27, which
governs and enumerates the circumstances under which grand jury materials may be disclosed.
10
EFTA02734632
Again, the court acknowledges the Newspaper's vibrant and sincere arguments for seeking
disclosure as a matter of public interest and in "furthering justice" in the broader sense of the term.
Nonetheless, "(u)nder fundamental principles of separation of powers, courts cannot judicially
alter the wording of statutes where the Legislature clearly has not done so." Fla. Dept of Revenue,
789 So. 2d at 324.
diAEven if "furthering justice as stated in section 905.27 could be exten yond the
specific situations prescribed by that statute, still the court cannot do so, he court notes the
Order issued by this court (The Honorable Krista Marx) in State of Fl i a ,grey Epstein, No.
50-5006-CF-009454-AXXX (Order, Jan. 4, 2020), in whhi a rt denied the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement's motion for disclosure 4 e grand jury materials at issue
here:
Although the term "furthering
exception in both common law and
is actually quite narrow — it do
justice," but rather requires
which outweighs any inte
another manner. Brook!
that "a party seeking d
showing of a particulari
(citing United St
added))). Su
speculatio
trial c
dete 66
t
" ms quite broad, the history of the
m c se law establishes that the exception
mpass any reason that could "further
of a particularized and compelling need
ntaining secrecy and cannot be satisfied in
495 So. 2d 135, 137-38 (Fla. 1986) (holding
[of grand jury proceedings] must make a strong
in order to outweigh the public interest in secrecy"
Sells Enig, Inc.. 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983) (emphasis
a s owing must be comprised of "more than a mere surmise or
Minto , 113 So. 2d at 365. If a party makes this a showing, then the
examine the grand jury testimony in camera and make a
of its materiality. Id. Disclosure should then be permitted only if
the attainment of justice." Brookings, 495 So. 2d at 138; Minton, 113
365.
This court reiterates that the term "furthering justice", as recognized in the foregoing quote,
still requires the showing of a particularized and compelling need which outweighs any interest in
maintaining secrecy and cannot be satisfied in another manner. The court also finds that such a
showing has not been made here.
11
EFTA02734633
It is true that "furthering justice" is an amorphous term which can be read to support a
broad range of justifications for disclosure. Black's Law Dictionary offers several contexts in
which the term "justice" has been defined. Id. (11th Ed. 2019). It may well be that the disclosure
of Jeffery Epstein's grand jury records could reveal that fair treatment did not occur and that Mr.
Epstein might have escaped appropriate punishment through some failing of our justice system.
However, the public's generalized interest in investigating that potential inj
considered and weighed against the specific policies in favor of grand jury,
preserve the safety of grand jurors and witnesses and encourage
testimony in all cases submitted to grand jury. See Grand J a V
41 „)Petersburg, Fla. 624 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (citi i v. State, 113 So. 2d 361 (Fla.
as, 1959)). Here, the justification for disclosure is den y from the notoriety of the accused
tone were enough to compel disclosure of
ling effect on witnesses and jurors considering
and the public's suspicion of unfair treatment
grand jury records, it could have an unin ed c %.,
must be
—policies that
and unhampered
nn, A.D. v. City of St.
the indictment of powerful indiv' future grand jury proceedings. In any event, the
Newspaper in the present case to establish a particularized and compelling need which
outweighs any interest in ' wing grand jury secrecy.
Finally, t court' "inherent power" does not give it carte blanche to ignore legal
mandate simply because it finds the underlying cause particularly worthy.
umstances presented above will induce the Legislature to amend section 905.27 to
precedent or
Perha
grant the courts additional authority or leeway in ruling on unique cases such as this one.
Alternatively, an appeal of this order might persuade a higher court to establish a less restrictive
interpretation of the "furthering justice" exception, the limitations of section 905.27, and the limits
of a court's "inherent authority." Until that time, this court is bound by the fundamental doctrines
12
EFTA02734634
of statutory construction, separation of powers and stare decisis to rule according to the law as it
exists today.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the constraints imposed upon this court by section 905.27, the court has limited
authority to order the release of grand jury records. No matter how palatable and persuasive the
Newspaper's arguments may be, the court cannot exercise that limited authority Nor does
the court's "inherent authority" permit it to broaden the statute's limits. Th mends both
parties' attorneys for their exceptional oral and written presentations.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDG a al judgment is hereby
entered dismissing this action in its entirety. Defendant J e o, in his capacity as Clerk
of the Circuit Court & Comptroller for Palm Bea 1 go hence without day. The court
reserves jurisdiction to entertain any motio ur der Rule 1.525, Florida Rules of Civil
Procedure. This is a final, appealable judgment.
DONE and ENTERED in Palm Beach County, Florida.
+o
Name
CYNTHIA M GUERRA
n/a
n/a
— 1 7 /
502019C/191 X 0 pip,' 2Cten pip ,'
00210 Halel• Circuit Judge
5020I9CA014601XXXXMB 12002021
Donald Halele
Circuit Judge
Address Email
13
Clerk_e-
[Email Redacted]
EFTA02734635
E fiti54 STAR T-6TH FLOOR
ALB Y Y i
Name Address Email
961687 GATEWAY BLVD SUITE
DOUGLAS A. WYLER 201-I FERNANDINA BEACH, FL [Email Redacted]
32034
JAMES CULLEN MOONEY n/a
JESSICA NEER MCDONALD
KENNETH G. TURKEL n/a
POST OFFICE BOX 229 WEST
PALM BEACH, FL 33401
LAUREN R. WHETSTONE 777 S FLAGLER DR STE 300 E
WEST PALM BEACH, FL 33
MARK F. BIDEAU n/a
MICHAEL GRYGIEL
MICHAEL J. GRYGIEL
1840 CENTURY PARK EAST
NINA D. BOYAJIAN UITE 1900 LOS ANGELES, CA
90067
NINA D. B Y n/a
SHANE B. T
Ae
n/a
207
[Email Redacted],
[Email Redacted]
CLERK_E-
[Email Redacted],
jnmcdonald@mY achcferk.com
kturkel@ba'o
lisa.meri eta jocuva.com,
teri.dele baidcuva.com
[Email Redacted],
@gtlaw.com,
[Email Redacted]
[Email Redacted],
[Email Redacted],
[Email Redacted]
[Email Redacted]
[Email Redacted]
[Email Redacted],
[Email Redacted]
[Email Redacted],
[Email Redacted]
5100 TOWN CENTER CIR SUITE [Email Redacted],
STEPHEN A. MENDELSOHN, ESQ [Email Redacted], 400 BOCA RATON, FL 33486 [Email Redacted]
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EFTA02734636